Doncaster Metropolitan Borough Council v Hancock

Summary judgment does not breach Article 6 merely because it determines an issue without a full oral trial. It is appropriate where the legal position is clear and further factual investigation cannot assist. An earlier judicial observation that an action should proceed to trial does not preclude a later application for summary judgment. A default judgment is a procedural step permitted by the rules, not an absolute entitlement, and may be set aside where justice requires. Where the applicable pension regulations do not permit redundancy compensation and ill-health compensation to run together, receipt of one excludes entitlement to the other.

Mr Hancock, a former employee of Doncaster Metropolitan Borough Council, received a redundancy payment and subsequently obtained ill-health retirement benefits. The Council sought repayment of the redundancy payment and obtained summary judgment. Mr Hancock later entered judgment in default on a counterclaim, which Master Foster set aside and struck out. Ian Kennedy J had earlier dismissed his appeal against summary judgment, and Elias J dismissed his appeal against Master Foster’s order on 23 August 2001.

Mr Hancock sought permission for a second appeal, alleging procedural unfairness, breaches of Articles 6 and 1 of the First Protocol, errors concerning the date on which his employment ended, and misapplication of the pension regulations. The central issues were whether the counterclaim had effectively been determined, whether both forms of compensation could be claimed, and whether permission should be granted.

1. Permission refused. The proposed appeal had no real prospect of success, raised no important point of principle or practice, and disclosed no other compelling reason for an appeal to be heard.
2. Summary judgment was procedurally permissible. The principle stated in Kent v Griffiths [2000] 2 WLR 1158 confirmed that courts may determine clear issues at an early stage where further investigation of the facts would not assist. Summary judgment did not itself contravene Article 6. The fact that earlier hearings had taken place in private did not alter that conclusion, as they pre-dated the Human Rights Act; such hearings were thereafter public under CPR 39.2.
3. Longmore J’s observation that the matter could proceed quickly to trial did not guarantee a full trial or prevent a subsequent application for summary judgment.
4. Although the earlier judgments did not expressly address the counterclaim, its substance was the asserted right to retain the redundancy payment. Their conclusion that the Council could recover that payment effectively disposed of the counterclaim.
5. The pension regulations did not permit redundancy compensation and ill-health compensation to run concurrently. That conclusion applied regardless of whether the alleged redundancy occurred on 1 October or 15 December 1995. In any event, the employment ended on 15 December 1995.
6. A default judgment is not an absolute right. It is a procedural step which the court may set aside under the rules where justice requires. The setting aside of Mr Hancock’s default judgment was therefore proper.

Application refused. No order for costs.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Permission for a second appeal from Elias J’s order of 23 August 2001 was refused.
• Queen’s Bench Division: Elias J dismissed Mr Hancock’s appeal against Master Foster’s order setting aside the default judgment and striking out the counterclaim.
• Queen’s Bench Division: Ian Kennedy J dismissed Mr Hancock’s appeal against summary judgment obtained by the Council on 25 July 1996.
• Master Foster: On 10 October 2000, the counterclaim was struck out and the default judgment was set aside.