HM Attorney General v Edwards

A Civil Proceedings Order under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 does not, merely by restricting access to the courts, infringe Convention rights. The procedure regulates court process while preserving access for a proper cause of action with some chance of success, subject to High Court permission. Persistent and habitual litigation may justify such an order. Where no arguable fault or procedural flaw is shown, permission to appeal may be refused.

The applicant, who was serving a life sentence, had brought numerous proceedings concerning his treatment in prison, the conduct of solicitors and alleged racial discrimination involving public authorities. The Divisional Court, on 20 June 2001, made a Civil Proceedings Order against him under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981.

He applied for permission to appeal. The central issues were whether the vexatious litigant procedure was incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights and whether the Divisional Court had made any error or procedural flaw in granting the order.

Henry LJ delivered the judgment of the court. Simon Brown LJ agreed, and the application for permission to appeal was unanimously refused.

1. Vexatious litigation. The proceedings considered by the Divisional Court demonstrated a strong case of persistent and habitual litigation requiring the control of the High Court. The Civil Proceedings Order was therefore properly made under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981.
2. Convention rights. Regulating a vexatious litigant’s access to the courts through the statutory procedure did not offend the European Convention on Human Rights. The restriction regulated the court’s process rather than imposing an absolute denial of access. A person with a proper cause of action and some chance of success could apply to the High Court for permission to bring the proceedings.
3. Permission to appeal. The court found no fault or flaw in the proceedings leading to the order. The grounds disclosed no basis on which permission could properly be granted, and the proposed appeal was doomed to inevitable failure.
4. Further procedural point. If permission to bring a proposed action was refused under the procedure, no appeal lay against that refusal.

Order: application refused.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Permission to appeal was refused on 4 December 2001.
2. Divisional Court: On 20 June 2001, a Civil Proceedings Order was made against the applicant under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981.