Haley, R (on the application of) v London Borough Of Harrow

Access to a child protection register may be restricted where the restrictions are objectively justified by confidentiality and child-protection considerations. A person cannot use judicial review to relitigate issues already determined in family or earlier judicial review proceedings. A complaint procedure limited to compliance with child-protection guidelines need not investigate complaints directed only to the merits of a conference decision. A more intensive approach to judicial review does not revive an unmeritorious challenge or displace decisions already reached.

The applicant challenged the London Borough of Harrow’s refusal, through its Area Child Protection Committee, to establish a review panel concerning a child protection conference. The conference had placed his daughter’s name on the Child Protection Register for emotional abuse. Earlier family proceedings and judicial review proceedings had rejected challenges to the conference.

Scott Baker J refused permission for judicial review and refused permission to appeal. The applicant renewed his request in the Court of Appeal, arguing that restrictions on access to the register and the ACPC’s refusal to follow its procedure breached Articles 6 and 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The central issues were whether the register restrictions were lawful and whether the ACPC’s decision was open to challenge.

1. Application refused. Laws LJ dismissed the renewed application for permission to appeal. The application had no merit and no realistic prospect of success.
2. The statutory restrictions governing access to the Child Protection Register were plainly objectively justified. The applicant therefore had no proper basis for claiming entitlement to inspect the register. The register concerned the child, not the applicant, and confidentiality restricted access to professionals for child-protection purposes.
3. The ACPC’s procedure permitted complaints about failure to follow guidelines governing child-protection investigations and conferences. Complaints directed merely to the merits of the conference decision fell outside that procedure. Having considered the applicant’s detailed complaints and the material before Scott Baker J, there was no basis for impugning the judge’s conclusion that further investigation was unwarranted.
4. The applicant’s challenge substantially sought to reopen matters already examined in the Family Division, on appeal, and in earlier judicial review proceedings. The more intensive scope of judicial review described in Daly did not improve his case or permit those matters to be relitigated.
5. The references to M and Beedell did not assist. M concerned a child’s rights where a secure accommodation order was sought. Beedell, reported in The Times 5th April 2001, concerned setting aside permission to appeal that had already been granted. Neither decision affected the present result.
6. The judge’s observation that consideration might be given to declaring the applicant a vexatious litigant was not such a declaration. Any such order would require an application by the Attorney-General under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 and determination by the Divisional Court. No order was made concerning that issue.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): renewed application for permission to appeal refused; the applicant was to receive a copy of the judgment at public expense.
• Administrative Court, Queen’s Bench Division: Scott Baker J refused permission for judicial review and permission to appeal on 10 September 2001.
• Administrative Court: earlier judicial review proceedings before Munby J had challenged the child protection conference; permission was refused, and this Court had previously refused permission to appeal.