Perotti v Watson & Ors

A contempt finding based on breach of a freezing order must identify whether the transaction exceeded the order’s monetary limit. Where the respondent’s assets within the jurisdiction already exceed that limit, payments which fall within the available balance do not constitute breaches, even though the respondent remains subject to the order. An appellate court should not interfere with findings of fact based on witness credibility unless there was no evidential basis for them or the judge plainly went wrong. A serious deliberate disposal of a substantial asset may justify imprisonment notwithstanding that other, less serious contempt findings are set aside.

The appellant challenged an order of Laddie J committing him to prison for three months for four alleged breaches of worldwide freezing orders made by Rimer J. He disputed the finding that he beneficially owned a flat transferred to his daughter and claimed that other assets were held on trust for his mother.

He also challenged the refusal of legal representation, the fairness of the appeal hearing, and the costs of a search and seizure order. The central issues were whether the factual findings were sustainable, whether each transaction breached the monetary limits of the freezing orders, and whether the sentence remained appropriate after any findings were varied.

1. Factual findings and representation. The court upheld Laddie J’s rejection of the alleged trusts. His conclusions were based on a detailed assessment of inconsistent statements, documents and oral evidence. An appellate court does not retry such issues and may interfere only where there was no basis for the conclusion or the judge obviously went wrong. The appellant had chosen to represent himself after rejecting the advice of solicitors and counsel. In those circumstances, the judge was entitled to proceed without imposing legal representation.
2. Freezing-order limits. On the finding that the appellant owned Ivor Court and his other English assets, his assets within the jurisdiction already exceeded the monetary limits of the freezing orders before the two payments made on 19 June 1999. Those payments therefore did not constitute breaches. The findings of contempt relating to them were set aside.
3. Remaining contempt and sentence. The transfer of Ivor Court and the later payment to the Woolwich were deliberate defiance of the orders and were substantially more serious. The disposal of Ivor Court was the most serious contempt, involving an asset worth more than £150,000. Three months’ imprisonment was not excessive and remained justified despite the removal of two findings.
4. Search-and-seizure costs. The court refused permission to amend the notice of appeal to challenge the costs order. The allegations concerning the execution of the search order were raised too late and could not fairly be investigated against the supervising solicitor.

The committal appeal was allowed only to the extent of deleting sub-paragraphs (iii) and (iv) of Laddie J’s order. The application concerning the search-and-seizure costs was refused.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): appeal from the committal order of Laddie J. The court deleted the findings concerning the two payments made on 19 June 1999, but upheld the finding concerning the transfer of Ivor Court, the later Woolwich payment and the three-month sentence.
• High Court, Chancery Division: Laddie J committed the appellant to prison for three months for four breaches of freezing orders and made a separate costs order concerning a search and seizure order.