Perotti v Watson & Ors

When deciding whether to extend time for an appeal, the court must consider the length and explanation of the delay, the merits of the proposed appeal and the interests of justice. The merits must be sufficiently strong to justify overlooking an inordinate delay, especially where interlocutory orders are concerned because time limits promote finality. A judge’s decision merely to stop cross-examination after a claim to privilege against self-incrimination is not a binding ruling on the privilege issue where the issue was left unresolved and no order was made. A protective search and seizure procedure may provide a safer means of obtaining information than cross-examination, provided potentially incriminating documents are protected.

Mr Perotti sought an extension of time and permission to appeal against a search and seizure order made by Blackburne J on 7 July 1999 and a subsequent disclosure order made by Laddie J on 16 July 1999. The applications were made on 20 December 2000, more than 16 months out of time.

The orders followed freezing orders and contempt proceedings. Mr Perotti argued that Rimer J had already resolved the issue of privilege against self-incrimination, that the application should have been made to Rimer J, and that the proposed appeal was inseparably connected with his appeal against committal. The central issue was whether the delay should be excused because the proposed appeals had sufficiently strong merits.

Lord Justice Tuckey gave the leading judgment. Lord Justice Chadwick agreed, and Lord Justice Pill agreed with both judgments. The decision was unanimous.

1. Procedure. Applications for an extension of time and permission to appeal should ordinarily be determined before the merits of any related appeal. This identifies which issues can properly be argued. The applications were not shown to be inextricably linked with the appeal against committal.
2. Delay and merits. The delay was inordinate and inadequately explained. Mr Perotti knew that notices of appeal had not been filed and had been able to appeal the freezing order in time. Although the court had regard to the merits, they were not so strong as to justify overlooking the delay in the interests of justice. Time limits serve finality, particularly in relation to interlocutory orders.
3. Effect of Rimer J’s earlier step. Rimer J had merely stopped cross-examination after Mr Perotti claimed privilege against self-incrimination. He had not made a binding decision or ruling on the issue, and no order had been drawn up. Blackburne J should have been told that further applications had been reserved to Rimer J, but the omission made no difference because Blackburne J had been given sufficient background and new affidavit material cast doubt on Mr Perotti’s account of his means.
4. Search and seizure and disclosure. The safeguards in Blackburne J’s order, including supervision by an independent solicitor and protection for potentially incriminating documents, enabled the respondents to investigate the transaction without exposing Mr Perotti to self-incrimination. This was safer than cross-examination. No incriminating documents were seized, so Laddie J’s disclosure order could not be faulted.
5. Committal appeal. The committal concerned breach of the freezing order. The principal allegation had been established from information supplied by Mr Perotti, not from the search. The applications were therefore refused.

• Administrative Court: Blackburne J made the search and seizure order on 7 July 1999. Laddie J ordered disclosure of documents held by the supervising solicitor on 16 July 1999.
• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Applications for an extension of time and permission to appeal were refused.