Watson & Ors v Perotti & Anor

Permission to appeal should be confined to an issue having a real, rather than fanciful, prospect of success, unless another compelling reason justifies an appeal. An appellate court should not permit a party to reopen a discretionary decision merely by repeating objections to the weight given to relevant factors. A freezing order prohibiting dealings with identified assets restrains the creation of charges over those assets, whether or not the charge diminishes their value. The court will not assist a party to obtain registration of a disposition made in breach of its order, while leaving the enforceability of the charge for proceedings in which the chargees are parties.

Mr Perotti sought permission to appeal against orders made by Neuberger J in two related applications. The first order authorised remuneration for Mr Watson, an attorney administrator, and subsequently adjusted the amount after the judge discovered that the figure claimed included VAT. The second order dismissed an application concerning registration of charges created over property subject to a freezing order.

The applications raised whether the adjustment to remuneration was made without giving Mr Perotti a proper opportunity to make submissions, whether the discretionary remuneration decision should be reopened, and whether charges created after the freezing order could be registered despite inhibitions entered at the Land Registry.

1. First application. Permission to appeal against the remuneration order was granted only on the question whether the judge was entitled to adjust the quantum without hearing further submissions. The judge had changed the basis of his calculation after learning that the claimed sum included VAT, and there was force in the argument that the revised figure departed from the logic of his original judgment.
2. Permission was refused on the remaining grounds. The alleged procedural unfairness was not established. The judge was entitled to control cross-examination so as to maintain relevance. The jurisdictional objection based on the earlier removal proceedings was unrealistic, and the weight given to the competing discretionary factors was a matter for the judge. The principles in Re the Duke of Norfolk's Settlement [1982] Ch 61 did not require restatement.
3. The conventional permission test under CPR 52.3(6) required a real, rather than fanciful, prospect of success or another compelling reason. The matter did not warrant permission as a test case, and the Court of Appeal was not the forum for a fresh cross-examination into Mr Watson's conduct.
4. Second application. Permission to appeal was refused. A freezing order prohibiting Mr Perotti from disposing of or dealing with assets, including the identified properties, restrained the creation of charges over those properties. The prohibition applied whether or not the charges reduced the value of the assets.
5. The court declined to determine whether the charges were enforceable or registrable as between the chargees and Mr Perotti. The application sought assistance in affecting a disposition which the court had ordered Mr Perotti not to make, and therefore could not succeed.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Permission to appeal against Neuberger J's 5 July 2001 order was granted on the limited quantum-adjustment issue, and refused on all other grounds.
• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Permission to appeal against Neuberger J's 26 September 2001 order was refused.