Ranger v Ranger & Anor

Permission to appeal will be refused where the proposed grounds disclose no solid basis for disturbing findings of fact, discretionary orders or conclusions on limitation. A partnership which continues to hold assets on trust after a general dissolution is not necessarily governed by the statutory limitation provision applicable to a partner’s retirement. The court’s choice between an order for sale and an order permitting one partner to buy out the others is discretionary. Fresh evidence which was available at trial will be admitted only exceptionally, and the court remains slow to receive it despite the less rigid force of the rule in Ladd v Marshall.

Noel Ranger brought proceedings in the Chancery Division against his brother Victor concerning properties used in a hostel business. Shirley Williams became a defendant and counterclaimed, asserting that the properties were partnership assets held on trust. The trial judge declared that Noel, Victor and Shirley had formed an equal partnership and ordered sale of the properties with equal distribution of the net proceeds.

Victor sought permission to appeal against the order, permission to amend his grounds, and permission to adduce fresh evidence. The proposed appeal challenged limitation conclusions, the form of the order, and the trial judge’s findings and omissions in fact-finding.

1. Applications refused. The court refused permission to appeal. It also formed the provisional view that the application to adduce fresh evidence was unlikely to succeed because the material had been available at trial and had not been introduced then.
2. The limitation arguments were hopeless. The evidence supported a continuing partnership arrangement after the 1985 transfer of the legal title. Any subsisting partnership was dissolved by Noel’s bankruptcy in 1991, but, where partnership assets continued to be held in trust after a general dissolution, Popat v Shonchhatra [1996] 1 WLR 1367 showed that section 43 of the Partnership Act 1890 did not apply. The claims were founded on fiduciary obligations, so section 21(1), rather than section 5, of the Limitation Act 1980 was relevant.
3. An order permitting one partner to buy out the others, of the kind approved in Syers v Syers (1876) 1 App Cas 175, was discretionary. The trial judge was best placed to determine what justice required, and had not been asked to make such an order.
4. The criticisms of the trial judge’s factual findings did not establish any miscarriage of justice. The judge had assessed the witnesses, accepted Shirley’s evidence, and reached findings supported by documentary evidence. The court saw no sufficiently solid ground for distinguishing between the respondents’ positions. Permission to appeal was therefore refused in relation to both proposed respondents.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): permission to appeal against the order of His Honour Judge Boggis QC dated 3 August 2001 was refused. Applications for amendment of the grounds and fresh evidence were also refused or treated as having no sufficient prospect of success.
• High Court, Chancery Division, Birmingham District Registry: declarations were made that the parties had entered into an equal partnership and that the relevant properties were partnership assets. Orders for sale, equal distribution of net proceeds and costs were made.