O'Reilly v Hampshire Fire and Rescue Service

A delayed onset of severe psychiatric symptoms does not, by itself, prevent a finding that an accident caused post-traumatic stress disorder. Nor is a return to work necessarily inconsistent with that diagnosis, since avoidance may take other forms. An appellate court will not interfere with a trial judge’s preference between competing expert opinions where the conclusion was properly open on the evidence. A later stressful event does not necessarily constitute a new cause where the original psychiatric injury made the claimant more vulnerable to it.

The claimant, a fire officer, suffered physical injuries when a fire engine collided with a lorry during an emergency call. Liability for those injuries was admitted. The dispute concerned whether the accident caused the claimant’s later psychiatric illness, diagnosed by the treating clinicians as post-traumatic stress disorder, and whether the illness caused his eventual loss of employment.

The Central London County Court, before His Honour Judge Hallgarten QC, awarded £279,611 in damages. The defendant applied for permission to appeal and for a stay of execution, arguing that contemporaneous records showed recovery, that the claimant’s return to normal duties was inconsistent with post-traumatic stress disorder, and that later workplace events or substance abuse caused the illness.

1. Applications dismissed. Permission to appeal and a stay of execution were refused.
2. The principal challenge was to the trial judge’s assessment of competing psychiatric evidence. The judge was entitled to prefer the evidence of the treating doctors and psychologists, who consistently considered the claimant’s condition to be post-traumatic stress disorder caused by the accident, over the evidence of the defendant’s expert.
3. The contemporaneous references to improvement in 1995 did not compel a finding of complete recovery. The judge was entitled to consider those records in context, including the claimant’s dedication to his career and his wish to return to work. A return to work was not necessarily inconsistent with post-traumatic stress disorder because avoidance behaviour could take other forms.
4. The delay before the claimant’s condition became severe did not prevent the accident from being a cause of the illness. The evidence permitted the judge to conclude that the claimant’s behaviour had not returned fully to normal and that the later symptoms formed part of a continuing condition.
5. The judge was also entitled to conclude that any deterioration associated with the claimant’s 1997 dilemma did not amount to a new cause. The post-traumatic stress disorder had made him more vulnerable to that later difficulty.
6. These were conclusions properly available on the evidence. The application did not disclose a realistic basis for appellate interference with the trial judge’s factual and expert-evidence assessments.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The defendant applied for permission to appeal against the Central London County Court order of 9 October 2001 and for a stay of execution. Both applications were dismissed.
• Central London County Court: His Honour Judge Hallgarten QC awarded the claimant £279,611 damages for personal injuries.