L (A Child), Re

Permission to appeal may be refused where an application is substantially out of time, lacks merit, and has become wholly academic. An appeal against a care order is academic where the order has already been discharged and nothing effective can result from rehearing the care proceedings. Appellate courts will not interfere with a trial judge’s preference between competing expert opinions where the judge gives full reasons and evaluates the evidential basis for those opinions. A care order may be made under Children Act 1989, section 31, where the evidence establishes that the child was at risk of significant harm. Properly conducted care proceedings do not breach Articles 6 or 8 where the parent has received a fair hearing and the interference is lawful, necessary and proportionate.

The mother sought permission to appeal, with an extension of time, against a care order made by His Honour Judge Peppitt QC at Canterbury County Court on 5 January 1999. The order placed her young son in the care of Kent County Council. The mother did not attend the Court of Appeal hearing. By then, the child had been permanently removed from the jurisdiction under an order of the court and the care order had been discharged after the care plan was implemented. The proposed appeal challenged the judge’s evaluation of competing psychiatric and psychological evidence and alleged breaches of Articles 6 and 8. The central questions were whether permission should be granted out of time and whether any effective relief remained available.

Application dismissed; permission to appeal and an extension of time refused.

1. The application was nearly one year and ten months late. No satisfactory explanation was given. Although the court would be as lenient as possible, litigation required finality.
2. The proposed appeal was wholly academic. The care order had been discharged after the child’s permanent removal from the jurisdiction and implementation of the care plan. Nothing could result from rehearing the care proceedings.
3. The judge was entitled to prefer the evidence of Dr Earle and Mr Maggs over that of Dr Tannock. He gave full reasons, found Dr Earle the more convincing witness, considered that Dr Tannock expressed his opinion with greater confidence than the facts justified, and relied on the former experts’ ability to explain the mother’s extraordinary behaviour. The judge also took account of the incomplete account given to Dr Tannock.
4. On that evidence, the mother’s behaviour put the child at risk and amounted to significant harm within section 31 of the Children Act 1989. The Court of Appeal could not properly interfere with the evaluative conclusion.
5. The judge had given the mother a fair hearing, including securing assistance from counsel. The care order was made in accordance with the law, was necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the child’s health and rights, and struck a proper balance under Article 8. There was no unfairness contrary to Article 6.
6. Because the mother was absent, the order was not to be drawn until 18 January, allowing her to apply to reinstate the application.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Application for permission to appeal and extension of time refused. The care order made by the Canterbury County Court on 5 January 1999 had already been discharged, rendering the proposed appeal wholly academic.
• Canterbury County Court: His Honour Judge Peppitt QC made a care order placing the child in the care of Kent County Council.