Spiro, R (on the application of) v Immigration Appellate Authority

A refusal of permission to seek judicial review on the papers is wholly subsumed when the applicant exercises the right to renew the application before an independent judge. A challenge to the earlier refusal is therefore moot where the applicant gains the opportunity for a fresh decision and cannot obtain any practical benefit from the challenge. A High Court judge’s office as President of the Immigration Appeal Tribunal does not, without more, create apparent bias when reviewing an Immigration Appeal Tribunal decision in which the judge took no part. The relevant informed observer would regard the judge as independent.

The applicant sought judicial review of the refusal by the Immigration Appeal Tribunal on 27 February 2001 to grant permission to appeal against a special adjudicator’s dismissal of his asylum appeal. Collins J refused permission on the papers on 15 June 2001. The applicant renewed the application before Stanley Burnton J, who refused permission on 20 August 2001.

Permission to appeal had already been granted on substantive issues concerning evidence, but permission was refused on the preliminary apparent-bias issue. The applicant argued that Collins J’s position as President of the Immigration Appeal Tribunal made him apparently biased when refusing permission to challenge an Immigration Appeal Tribunal decision. The renewed application concerned whether that issue should proceed on a public-interest basis.

1. Application refused. The renewed application for permission to appeal on the apparent-bias issue was refused. The applicant already had permission to appeal on the substantive issues and was therefore in as good a position as if Collins J had granted permission to seek judicial review.
2. The paper refusal by Collins J had been entirely subsumed by the later decision of Stanley Burnton J, made after the applicant exercised the right to renew the application in court. There was no suggestion of apparent bias on Stanley Burnton J’s part. The challenge to the earlier decision was consequently moot and arid as against the applicant.
3. There was no sufficient public-interest reason to entertain the point. The fact that Collins J was a High Court judge and, for the time being, President of the Immigration Appeal Tribunal did not mean that a reasonable person could apprehend bias when he later considered an Immigration Appeal Tribunal decision in which he had taken no part.
4. The Immigration Appeal Tribunal’s decisions were made independently by the members sitting in each case. To an informed person, Collins J was wholly and entirely independent when acting judicially in the High Court. The court considered the suggested apprehension of bias unreal and refused permission.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On 21 December 2001, the renewed application for permission to appeal on the preliminary apparent-bias issue was refused. Permission had already been granted on separate substantive issues.
• Administrative Court: Stanley Burnton J refused permission to seek judicial review on 20 August 2001, following the applicant’s renewal of an earlier paper refusal.
• Paper decision: Collins J refused permission to seek judicial review on 15 June 2001.