SCREEN PARTNERS LONDON LTD v VIF FILM PRODUCTION GMBH & CO

On an application for summary judgment under Civil Procedure Rules 1998, the court must decide whether the claim has a real prospect of success, not determine the ultimate merits. A contractual construction issue should proceed to trial where the meaning of commercial terminology may depend on the factual matrix and expert market evidence. Policies need not be identical for the court to consider whether one falls within a contractual description of insurance. An alternative quantum meruit claim remains live unless it has been expressly or impliedly abandoned. Procedural principles restricting new points on appeals after a trial do not necessarily apply to an appeal from summary judgment where the issue is whether the claimant is entitled to a trial.

Screen Partners claimed that German film-production partnerships breached exclusive arrangements contained in letters dated 13 November 1998 and 6 May 1999 by obtaining a different form of film-finance insurance. It also claimed, alternatively, a quantum meruit.

The deputy judge granted summary judgment under CPR 24, holding that the new policy was not TVC, shortfall or gap insurance within the contractual meaning and that the remaining claim would fall away. Screen Partners appealed, arguing that the policies raised arguable questions of construction and that its alternative claim had not been abandoned. The central issue was whether the claim had a real prospect of success and should proceed to trial.

1. Appeal allowed. The court was not deciding the correct construction of the letters or policies. The question under CPR 24 was whether Screen Partners had a real prospect of succeeding at trial.
2. The deputy judge had not adequately construed the expressions TVC, shortfall or gap insurance in the contractual context. The critical question was whether the new policy fell within the wording of the 6 May 1999 agreement. That question might require expert market evidence, and the policies did not have to be identical before the new policy could arguably fall within the contractual description.
3. The deputy judge’s conclusion that the policies insured different risks was insufficient to establish that the contractual claim had no real prospect of success. The defendants might ultimately succeed, but the dispute required trial determination.
4. The procedural authorities concerning new points, evidence and claims raised on appeal after a completed trial did not govern this appeal. This was an appeal from summary judgment concerned with entitlement to a trial.
5. The alternative quantum meruit claim had not been abandoned. It had not been considered on its merits and had not been shown to have no real prospect of success. It therefore also required a trial.
6. Appeal allowed with costs here and below. The defendants were ordered to pay £30,000 on account of costs, subject to the further directions recorded in the order.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): allowed the appeal against the deputy High Court judge’s summary judgment order and costs order.
• Chancery Division, High Court: Mr David Mackie QC, sitting as a deputy High Court judge, granted summary judgment for the defendants under CPR 24 and dismissed the claim.