Berti v Steele Raymond (A Firm)

Permission for a second appeal may be granted only where the appeal raises an important point of principle or practice, or there is another compelling reason. That threshold may be met by a procedural question about whether justice and the overriding objective are served when successive judges deal summarily with a matter without sufficient regard to earlier hearings. In bankruptcy proceedings concerning a deceased person, a formal grant of representation is not necessarily the only route to securing representation of the estate. Permission was granted on the procedural point, without determining the merits of the bankruptcy order.

Mr Domenico Berti applied for permission to appeal from an order of His Honour Judge Weeks QC in the Chancery Division, which dismissed his appeal against a bankruptcy order made in respect of his deceased father. The bankruptcy order followed several county court hearings concerning a disputed solicitors’ debt and whether Mr Berti could represent the estate without Letters of Administration. Earlier judges had adopted differing degrees of procedural formality. The central issues were whether Mr Berti had standing and whether the statutory test for a second appeal was satisfied.

1. Application allowed. Lord Justice Robert Walker granted permission to appeal. The application was concerned with permission only; the court did not determine the validity of the bankruptcy order, the disputed debt, or the ultimate merits of the appeal.
2. Under section 55 of the Access to Justice Act 1999, a second appeal is permissible only where it would raise an important point of principle or practice, or where there is another compelling reason. The court was narrowly persuaded that the threshold was met.
3. The important point concerned the application of the overriding objective to proceedings handled by a succession of different judges. It was arguable that justice was inconsistent with each judge dealing with the matter summarily without sufficient regard to what had occurred at earlier hearings.
4. The court also considered the representation issue arguable. Under article 5 of the Administration of Insolvent Estates of Deceased Persons Order 1986, the court could have ordered service or re-service of the petition on Mr Berti so as to give him standing to represent the estate without requiring a formal grant. Alternatively, a similar course might have been available under rule 19.8 of the Civil Procedure Rules, as applied in insolvency matters.
5. The requirement imposed by Deputy District Judge Hine for a formal grant was discretionary and had not itself been appealed. Nevertheless, Mr Berti was an obvious candidate for appointment or recognition as a representative, and it was arguable that he might have standing to appeal if insisting on a formal grant had been an unreasonable exercise of discretion.
6. The court noted that a person may be adjudicated bankrupt after death under section 265 of the Insolvency Act 1986 and article 5 of the Administration Order, because the crucial date is presentation of the petition. Lord Justice Walker also urged Mr Berti to consider carefully whether continuing the appeal was in his and his mother’s interests.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On 22 February 2001, Lord Justice Robert Walker granted permission for a second appeal.
• Chancery Division: On 16 November 2000, His Honour Judge Weeks QC dismissed Mr Berti’s appeal on the ground that he had no grant of representation and therefore no standing.
• Bournemouth County Court: Deputy District Judge Hurley made the bankruptcy order on 23 June 2000. Deputy District Judge Edwards declined to set it aside on 10 July 2000.