Patterson v National Floor Coverings Ltd

A driver who sees young people emerging from behind a stationary or moving bus must take reasonable precautions. The driver cannot assume that they are sober, that they will remain stationary, or that no further person is hidden from view. Merely lifting the foot from the accelerator may be insufficient. Failure to brake is causative where reasonable braking or slowing would have altered the time, speed or position of the collision, or enabled avoidance. Contributory negligence is assessed by comparing the parties’ causative potency and blameworthiness. On the facts, the pedestrian was two-thirds responsible and the driver one-third responsible.

Patterson v National Floor Coverings Ltd concerned an appeal from the Leeds County Court. A 16-year-old claimant was struck by a car driven by the defendant’s employee after crossing behind a bus. The trial judge found that the driver had been negligent in failing to brake, but dismissed the claim on the basis that the negligence had not caused the accident. The central issue was whether appropriate braking would have made a causative difference and, if so, how responsibility should be apportioned.

1. Appeal and causation. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the trial judge’s order and substituted a finding that the defendant was liable, subject to the claimant being two-thirds responsible.
2. Negligence. Once the driver had seen young people appear to jog from behind the bus, he could not safely assume that they were sober, that those who had made eye contact would not move into his path, or that nobody else was obscured behind the bus. Taking his foot off the accelerator and continuing without braking was not sufficient in the circumstances.
3. Causation. The trial judge’s calculation failed to account for the full distance available before the collision. The evidence included the distance between the car and the bus when the boys were first seen, the length of the bus and the additional distance behind it. On the accepted evidence, braking would have given the claimant more time, reduced the speed or altered the position of the impact. The driver’s negligence therefore contributed to both the accident and the claimant’s injuries.
4. Contributory negligence. Apportionment required consideration of the parties’ comparative causative potency and comparative blameworthiness. The claimant’s blameworthiness was somewhat greater than the driver’s, making the trial judge’s proposed division of two-thirds to the claimant and one-third to the driver appropriate.
5. Order. The appeal was allowed with costs. The costs of the liability hearing were reserved to the judge determining quantum, with detailed public funding assessment of the claimant’s costs.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On 13 February 2001, the appeal was allowed. The trial order was set aside and liability was apportioned two-thirds to the claimant and one-third to the defendant.
2. Leeds County Court: On 24 February 2000, His Honour Judge Cockroft found the driver negligent but held that the negligence was not causative and dismissed the claim.