Ebert v Official Receiver & Anor

Litigation must have finality. A litigant may raise a challenge to the debt supporting a bankruptcy order at the proper procedural stage, including on the petition, against the statutory demand, or under section 282 of the Insolvency Act 1986. The litigant may not repeatedly reopen matters already examined and decided by the High Court and the Court of Appeal. Where there is no real prospect of a further appeal succeeding, permission should be refused and there is no proper basis for interim relief aimed at preserving property pending that appeal.

The applicant had been adjudicated bankrupt on a petition founded on a judgment debt assigned to the petitioning creditor. His repeated challenges concerned the existence of the debt, the validity of the assignment and the underlying liability. Mr Justice Neuberger dismissed a further application and granted limited permission to apply to the Court of Appeal for permission to appeal, notwithstanding an order under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981.

The applicant sought permission to appeal, an order restraining the sale of his former dwelling, annulment of the bankruptcy and a jury trial. The central issues were whether previously determined matters could be raised again and whether interim relief or further permission was justified.

1. Application dismissed. The Court of Appeal, comprising Lord Justice Chadwick and Lord Justice Buxton, unanimously dismissed the application for permission to appeal.
2. The applicant had been entitled to challenge the alleged debt, the assignment and the underlying liability at earlier stages: on the bankruptcy petition, against the statutory demand, or on an application under section 282(1) of the Insolvency Act 1986. Those matters had already been considered repeatedly by the High Court and the Court of Appeal.
3. The administration of justice requires finality in litigation. A litigant cannot continue to raise the same complaints in repeated applications merely because he disagrees with the conclusions previously reached. The judge below was entitled, and in the circumstances required, to refuse to revisit contentions which had already been examined and found to have no merit.
4. There was no real prospect that the Court of Appeal would interfere with the order of Mr Justice Neuberger dated 14 February 2001. Accordingly, there was no basis for granting permission to appeal.
5. Interim relief restraining completion of the sale of the property was also refused. Such relief could only be justified by a prospect that the bankruptcy order would be annulled and the trustee’s title to sell thereby defeated.
6. The question whether refusal of permission to apply to the Court of Appeal by a person subject to section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 would infringe rights under the Human Rights Act 1998 and the Convention was stood over for further consideration and judgment in writing.
7. The application for a transcript at public expense was refused. The court stated that there was no right of appeal to the House of Lords against an order refusing permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal and, in any event, would not have been minded to grant permission.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — application for permission to appeal against the order of Mr Justice Neuberger dated 14 February 2001 dismissed.
• High Court of Justice, Chancery Division — Mr Justice Neuberger dismissed the applicant’s further application and granted limited permission to apply to the Court of Appeal for permission to appeal.