Ahilathrunayagam v London Guildhall University & Anor

On a second-tier appeal, permission should be granted only where the case raises an important point of principle or practice, or where another compelling reason justifies an appeal. A challenge to a university’s decision concerning the award of a degree, if justiciable, must ordinarily be brought by judicial review rather than private law proceedings in the county court. Proceedings which substantially re-run an earlier adjudicated complaint may constitute an abuse of process. A claim against solicitors cannot proceed where the complained-of correspondence merely reports or responds to the client’s instructions and discloses no possible cause of action.

The claimant sought permission to appeal from Judge Medawar QC’s dismissal of his appeal against the striking out of proceedings by District Judge Appleman. The claim against the university concerned its alleged failure to award him a law degree, with later allegations of racial discrimination. The claim against the university’s solicitors concerned a letter responding to the claimant’s correspondence on the university’s instructions.

Similar proceedings had been struck out in 1996, when Judge Simpson held that any challenge to the university’s decision had to be brought by judicial review, applying Thorne v University of London [1966] 2 QB 237. The central issues were whether the renewed claims disclosed an arguable basis for permission and whether there was any important point of principle, practice or other compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to intervene.

Permission to appeal refused. Lord Justice Dyson held as follows:

1. Second-tier appeal. Under section 55(1) of the Access to Justice Act 1999, permission required an important point of principle or practice, or some other compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to hear the appeal. The claimant had not demonstrated either requirement.
2. Claim against the university. The substance of the complaint was that the university had wrongly refused to award a degree. Applying Thorne v University of London [1966] 2 QB 237, any such challenge had to be pursued by judicial review and could not be brought as a private law action in the county court. It was in any event far too late to commence judicial review proceedings.
3. Abuse of process. The current proceedings substantially repeated the complaint made in the 1996 proceedings. Although the later particulars contained some additional detail, the core allegation remained the same. Bringing fresh proceedings concerning effectively the same subject matter after an earlier judicial decision would be an abuse of process.
4. Claim against the solicitors. The December 1993 letter merely responded to the claimant’s earlier points and recorded instructions given by the university. It disclosed no possible cause of action against the solicitors.
5. The judge had also relied on limitation, which might have been applicable, but the Court of Appeal did not base its decision on that ground.

The application for permission to appeal was refused in respect of both defendants.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Permission to appeal from the Central London County Court was refused.
• Central London County Court: Judge Medawar QC dismissed the claimant’s appeal on 27 October 2000 and refused permission to appeal.
• District Judge: The claim was struck out on 8 March 2000.
• Earlier proceedings: Judge Simpson dismissed an appeal on 2 December 1996, holding that any challenge to the university’s decision had to be brought by judicial review.