B (A Child), Re

An adoption order should reflect the child’s actual family relationships and welfare needs. Where a child has a stable placement with a foster family while maintaining a strong and beneficial relationship with a natural parent and that parent’s family, adoption may be inconsistent with the arrangements intended to continue that relationship.

Parental agreement may be dispensed with only on a defined statutory ground. The question whether consent is withheld unreasonably is judged by what a reasonable parent might conclude. Two reasonable parents may reach opposite conclusions on the same facts. A parent is not unreasonable merely because professional opinion is divided and the parent adopts one of two reasonable views.

Any interference with family life must also be necessary and proportionate under Article 8.

This was an appeal from an adoption order made by His Honour Judge Cotterill in the Taunton County Court on 10 November 2000. The order authorised the adoption of J by his foster mother and dispensed with his father’s consent.

J had lived successfully with his foster mother since 1996 but had maintained a close and beneficial relationship with his father, paternal family and brothers. The guardian ad litem and an instructed expert considered that the existing care and placement arrangements would better promote J’s welfare, while the social worker supported adoption. The central issues were whether adoption was consistent with the proposed continuing family relationships, whether the father’s Article 8 rights had been adequately considered, and whether his refusal of consent was unreasonable.

1. The appeal was allowed. The adoption order was set aside and replaced by an order in terms to be settled for the father and guardian ad litem.
2. Per Lord Justice Thorpe, the plans supported by the parties were inconsistent with adoption. The proposed arrangements were intended to preserve J’s strong relationship with his father and paternal family. Adoption would be inconsistent with the reality that J was a member both of his foster mother’s family and of his father’s family.
3. The judge below had failed adequately to address the father’s right to family life under Article 8. The interference resulting from adoption had to be necessary and proportionate under Article 8(2). On the facts, proportionality was difficult to establish because a satisfactory non-adoption arrangement was available.
4. The father’s objection could not reasonably be overridden in circumstances where the guardian ad litem and the expert also opposed adoption. Per Lady Justice Hale, applying Re W [1971] AC 682, the test was what a reasonable parent might think. Two reasonable parents could reach opposite conclusions on the same facts. The father was therefore not unreasonable in adopting one of two reasonable views.
5. Lady Justice Hale further explained that a residence order, supported by appropriate protective and contact arrangements, could provide legal permanence, security and stability while preserving the child’s existing family relationships. Adoption was not the only means of securing permanence.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Allowed the appeal from the adoption order made by the Taunton County Court on 10 November 2000. The order was set aside and substituted.
• Taunton County Court: Made an adoption order in favour of the foster mother and dispensed with the father’s consent.