Mincoff Science & Gold (now known as "Mincoffs Solicitors") v Ganatra

A renewed application for permission to appeal may be treated as a second appeal where that is its substance. A court may refuse a substantial and indefinite adjournment of such an application, even where the applicant’s ill health is accepted, because civil proceedings must be progressed expeditiously and other parties are entitled to know their position. Permission should be refused where the proposed appeal has no arguable ground or real prospect of success and raises no important point of principle or practice, or other compelling reason. An order striking out a defence and counterclaim under rule 3.4(2) will stand where no arguable challenge is shown.

A firm of solicitors claimed £981.30 plus interest for unpaid fees after acting on a proposed negligence claim against the defendant’s medical advisers. The defendant denied liability and counterclaimed for approximately £250,000, alleging negligent conduct of the retainer.

On 6 April 2000, District Judge Caddick struck out the Defence and Counterclaim under rule 3.4(2) of the Civil Procedure Rules. Judge Russell-Vick later refused an extension of time for appealing that order, concluding that the proposed appeal had no real prospect of success. The defendant made a renewed application for permission to appeal, also seeking a further adjournment because of ill health. The central issues were whether the application should be adjourned and whether there was any arguable basis for challenging the earlier orders.

Lord Justice Jonathan Parker dismissed the renewed application for permission to appeal.

1. Jurisdiction. The Court of Appeal had jurisdiction to entertain the renewed application against the refusal of an extension of time because, in substance, it amounted to a second appeal.
2. Adjournment. The defendant’s ill health was accepted and attracted the court’s sympathy, but it did not justify putting the case on hold for a substantial and indefinite period. Applications for permission to appeal should be dealt with as expeditiously as reasonably possible. This served both the efficient administration of civil justice and the interests of the other parties, who were entitled to know their position.
3. Prospects of appeal. The court could identify no arguable ground for appealing the district judge’s order or for challenging Judge Russell-Vick’s refusal of an extension. The material disclosed nothing suggesting that the claimant solicitors had been negligent in carrying out the retainer.
4. Other compelling reason. The proposed appeal raised no important point of principle or practice and disclosed no other compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to hear it. The order striking out the Defence and Counterclaim under rule 3.4(2) of the Civil Procedure Rules therefore disclosed no basis for appellate intervention.

The application was dismissed.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — On 8 March 2001, Lord Justice Jonathan Parker refused a further adjournment and dismissed the renewed application for permission to appeal.
2. Medway County Court — On 14 June 2000, His Honour Judge Russell-Vick QC refused an extension of time for serving an appellant’s notice, concluding that the proposed appeal had no real prospect of success.
3. County Court — On 6 April 2000, District Judge Caddick struck out the Defence and Counterclaim under rule 3.4(2) of the Civil Procedure Rules and entered judgment for the claimant.