Shalom & Anor v Pulis & Ors

A refusal by the High Court to grant permission to appeal cannot itself be appealed to the Court of Appeal. A further application for permission may be made only within the limited jurisdiction preserved by the rules of court. In a second-appeal case, permission also requires an important point of principle or practice, or another compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to hear the appeal. Defective particulars which disclose no reasonable grounds of claim do not satisfy that threshold. Further evidence will not ordinarily be admitted where it could reasonably have been obtained earlier and would not assist in establishing the statutory threshold. No separate infringement of Article 6 was shown.

The first claimant sought permission to appeal from the refusal by Her Honour Judge Elizabeth Steel, sitting as a deputy High Court judge, to grant permission to appeal against Master Tennant’s order striking out the particulars of claim against the fourth and fifth defendants and ordering costs. The proposed claim alleged fraud, conspiracy and the use of forged or fictitious documents, but supplied no further particulars.

The claimant also sought permission to rely on further evidence and alleged that refusal to permit amendments infringed Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The central issues were whether this court had jurisdiction to entertain an appeal against the judge’s refusal of permission and, if so, whether the proposed second appeal met the statutory threshold.

1. Application refused. Clarke LJ held that the proposed appeal was a second appeal, but that the Court of Appeal had no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal against the High Court judge’s decision refusing permission to appeal. Section 54(4) of the Access to Justice Act 1999 expressly prohibited such an appeal, subject only to any further application for permission authorised by the rules of court. The relevant appeal court was the court presided over by the High Court judge, so the statutory prohibition applied.
2. If that conclusion were wrong, section 55(1) of the Access to Justice Act 1999 nevertheless required the proposed second appeal to raise an important point of principle or practice or to present some other compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to hear it. The case met neither requirement. The particulars of claim did not disclose any reasonable grounds for proceedings against the fourth and fifth defendants; the allegations of collusion, forged documents and conspiracy were wholly unparticularised.
3. No issue of admitting further evidence arose once the application failed. In any event, the evidence would have been refused because it could reasonably have been obtained before the Master or the High Court judge, and it did not assist in showing an important point of principle or practice or another compelling reason for hearing the appeal.
4. The court detected no infringement of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The application, including the request for further evidence, was refused on the materials before the court. The formal order was: application for permission to appeal refused.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Permission to appeal refused. The court held that section 54(4) of the Access to Justice Act 1999 barred an appeal against the High Court’s refusal of permission. Alternatively, the proposed second appeal failed the section 55(1) threshold.
2. High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division: Her Honour Judge Elizabeth Steel, sitting as a deputy High Court judge, refused permission to appeal against Master Tennant’s order.
3. Master Tennant: Ordered the particulars of claim against the fourth and fifth defendants to be struck out and ordered the claimants to pay their costs assessed at £2,366.72.