Jest v Thistle Hotels Plc

In a civil claim for an injury allegedly sustained at work, the claimant must prove on the balance of probabilities that the material injury occurred in the workplace. A trial judge who carefully analyses the evidence and concludes that the claim is not proved need not expressly state that the claimant’s evidence is rejected or that the claimant has been dishonest. It is sufficient to find that the central account is not established. An appellate court should not interfere with a properly supported factual conclusion.

Ronald Jest appealed from the judgment of His Honour Judge Grenfell in Leeds County Court on 23 November 2000, which dismissed his claim against Thistle Hotels Plc. He alleged that an MDF board struck and fractured his knee while he was working for the respondent on 27 August 1997. The respondent denied that the material injury occurred at work. The judge found that, if the accident had occurred as alleged, there would have been a breach of duty, including under the Manual Handling Operations Regulations 1992, but held that the appellant had not proved that the fracture resulted from a workplace accident. The appeal concerned the adequacy of the judge’s credibility findings and his assessment of the conflicting factual and medical evidence.

Mr Justice Bennett delivered the principal judgment. Lord Justice Tuckey agreed. Lord Justice Simon Brown gave a separate judgment agreeing that the appeal should be dismissed and materially confirming the reasoning.

1. Appeal dismissed. The trial judge had carefully analysed the evidence and was entitled to conclude that the appellant had not proved that the fracture was caused by an accident at work.
2. A judge who finds that a claimant has failed to prove the claim on the balance of probabilities need not expressly state that the claimant’s evidence is rejected or that the claimant has been dishonest. The judge’s conclusion may necessarily reject the claimant’s central account without a separate finding of dishonesty.
3. The judge was entitled to resolve the conflicts in the evidence. He accepted Mr Welborn’s account of the appellant’s later description of the accident, regarded Mr Haigh’s evidence of a possible limp as slight and unclear, and relied on the medical evidence, the omissions in the appellant’s and his wife’s statements, and the evidence about the appellant’s activities after work.
4. It was unnecessary to make a definitive finding that the injury occurred at the football match or that the appellant and his wife had perjured themselves. The claim failed because the appellant had not established the necessary workplace connection on the balance of probabilities.

The court accepted the judge’s conditional conclusion that the respondent would have been in breach of duty if the accident had occurred as alleged. The order was for dismissal of the appeal with costs under section 11 of the Legal Aid Act 1998, with the appellant’s contribution assessed at nil.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): dismissed the appeal and awarded costs under section 11 of the Legal Aid Act 1998, with the appellant’s contribution assessed at nil.
• Leeds County Court: His Honour Judge Grenfell dismissed the claim on 23 November 2000, finding that the appellant had not proved on the balance of probabilities that the fracture resulted from an accident at work.