M (Child), Re

A secure accommodation order is protective rather than criminal in character. Accordingly, Article 6(3) of the European Convention on Human Rights does not apply as a criminal-trial guarantee, although children facing such an application should receive equivalent minimum procedural safeguards as a matter of fairness.

Service requirements may be dispensed with or abridged where the rules permit and the child has been adequately informed. The court must nevertheless match the procedural safeguards to the gravity of restricting a child’s liberty. A child accommodated by a local authority, and subject to an interim care order, falls within the secure accommodation regime. A history of absconding may be established by repeated disappearances from home or accommodation.

C, a 15-year-old heroin and crack cocaine user, was accommodated by the local authority after a serious deterioration in her circumstances. The authority applied for an interim care order and a secure accommodation order under section 25 of the Children Act 1989.

The Family Proceedings Court made both orders after dispensing with service on C’s chosen solicitor and hearing the matter urgently. Johnson J dismissed C’s appeal, holding that the hearing was fair and that the evidence supported a history of absconding. C appealed to the Court of Appeal, challenging procedural fairness, the application of Article 6, her status as a child looked after by the authority, and the finding of repeated absconding.

1. Appeal dismissed. The Court of Appeal unanimously dismissed the appeal, subject to detailed assessment.
2. Thorpe LJ held that the local authority had complied with the one-day service requirement applicable to an application under section 25 of the Children Act 1989. Service on C’s parents and the guardian’s solicitors on 10 January was sufficient for the hearing at 2.30 pm on 11 January. C’s solicitor of choice was not appointed until the hearing, and the authority had made an unnecessary concession about a service error. In any event, the justices had power under Rule 8(8) to dispense with or abridge service.
3. The urgent hearing did not deny C a fair trial. The evidence was substantially documentary, much was uncontested or incapable of meaningful challenge, and there was no demonstrated evidential step that a longer adjournment would have enabled C to take. The secure accommodation jurisdiction was protective, not criminal. Article 6(3) therefore did not apply as a criminal-charge guarantee, although Thorpe LJ considered that children should receive its five minimum safeguards in adapted form.
4. Brooke LJ agreed that the proceedings were not criminal proceedings for Article 6(3). He stressed, however, that a mature child should ordinarily have adequate facilities and time to prepare, and that section 25(5) could have been used to keep C securely accommodated during a short adjournment. He nevertheless concurred in dismissal because no adjournment application had been made and the experienced judges below considered that further evidence would not have assisted.
5. C was a child being looked after by the local authority within section 22(1). She had been accommodated for her protection and was simultaneously made subject to an interim care order.
6. The evidence supported a history of absconding under section 25(1)(a). C had repeatedly disappeared from her family home and accommodation. The court declined to uphold the order under section 25(1)(b), because that alternative ground had not been invoked in the application and the justices had expressly founded the order on section 25(1)(a).

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): appeal from the Family Division dismissed. The Court upheld the interim care order and secure accommodation order.
• High Court, Family Division: Johnson J dismissed C’s appeal from the Family Proceedings Court, holding that the hearing was fair and that the evidence supported a history of absconding.
• Family Proceedings Court: made an interim care order and a secure accommodation order under section 25 of the Children Act 1989.