Tomlinson & Anor v Chief Constable of Hertfordshire

Evidence of later alleged misconduct is not ordinarily relevant to liability for an earlier arrest or assault, particularly where the pleaded case relies on it only for aggravated or exemplary damages. The court may exclude or control otherwise admissible evidence under CPR r.32.1.

In false-imprisonment claims, the judge determines whether the arresting officer had reasonable grounds for suspicion. The jury determines disputed facts only where a real factual issue must be resolved first. Reasonable suspicion is substantially below proof, and inconsistencies which do not undermine the objective basis for suspicion do not require the issue of lawful arrest to be left to the jury.

The claimants appealed against the dismissal of their claim in the Central London County Court by His Honour Judge Previte QC on 27 January 2000. They sought damages against the Chief Constable for wrongful arrest and assault, together with aggravated and exemplary damages.

The claimants challenged the exclusion of evidence concerning more than 50 alleged incidents of police harassment occurring after the arrest. They also argued that the judge had wrongly decided that the arrest was supported by reasonable grounds without leaving relevant factual issues to the jury, and that his explanation of that ruling prejudiced the jury's assessment of police witnesses.

1. Appeal dismissed. The evidence of alleged harassment after the arrest was pleaded as relevant to aggravated and exemplary damages. The claimants sought to use it also to challenge the credibility and motives of officers involved in the arrest. The court held that the claim concerned the narrower questions whether the arrest and assault in June or July 1993 were actionable. The later incidents did not materially bear on those issues. The trial judge was therefore entitled to exclude them from the liability stage. The same result would follow under the evidence-control power in CPR r.32.1.
2. Applying the approach in Dallison v Caffrey [1965] 1 QB 348, the judge decides whether the relevant conduct was reasonable and whether the arresting officer had reasonable grounds. The jury decides disputed facts only where there is a real conflict of evidence on a fact necessary for that decision. There was no sufficient factual issue requiring the question of lawful arrest to be left to the jury.
3. The information available to PC Binnee, including the report of the suspicious vehicle, the registration number, the long object in the car and the report of the stolen awning, provided an objective basis for reasonable suspicion. Following Hussein v Chong Fook Kam [1970] AC 942, suspicion is a conjecture or surmise where proof is lacking. The discrepancies about the object and descriptions of the stolen property did not undermine the basic grounds for arrest and could be investigated at interview.
4. There was no sufficient basis for concluding that the judge's explanation or summing-up wrongly led the jury to assume that the police witnesses were credible. The judge distinguished the legal ruling on reasonable grounds from the jury's task of deciding the alleged assaults and directed the jury even-handedly on credibility. Lord Justice Aldous agreed. Appeal dismissed, with no order for costs.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Appeal from the order of His Honour Judge Previte QC in the Central London County Court dated 27 January 2000, dismissing the claim. Permission to appeal was granted by Latham LJ on 28 June 2000. The appeal was dismissed.