Singh v Secretary Of State For The Home Department

In an asylum appeal, the decision-maker must assess all material evidence relevant to the future risk, applying the lower standard of proof appropriate to asylum claims. Expert evidence should not be dismissed merely because the expert has not cited supporting sources, particularly where the material is uncontradicted and the case requires anxious scrutiny. The court must assess the evidence as a whole. A history of arrest or police interest does not by itself establish a well-founded fear of persecution on return. The claimant must establish a reasonable likelihood that the relevant facts will expose them to persecution for a Convention reason.

The appellant, an Indian Sikh, claimed asylum on the basis of past detention and beatings by Punjab police following violence connected with a college Sikh student election. He feared arrest and persecution on return because warrants or police records might identify him at Delhi airport.

The Special Adjudicator accepted much of his account but dismissed the appeal, finding that he had lived safely in Delhi, obtained a passport in his own name and had not been pursued there. The Immigration Appeal Tribunal dismissed his appeal, placing limited weight on evidence from Dr Cynthia Mahmood concerning police lists and computer records. The central issue was whether the evidence established a reasonable likelihood of persecution on return.

1. Appeal dismissed. The Court of Appeal upheld the conclusions of the Special Adjudicator and the Immigration Appeal Tribunal, although each decision contained a feature properly reviewable on appeal.
2. May LJ held that the court should take account of additional material from Dr Cynthia Mahmood. In an asylum case, it would be unsatisfactory to exclude relevant material for purely procedural reasons. Her evidence was that some people in Punjab, including those with records of previous arrests and detentions or who were treated as habitual offenders, might remain at risk and that police lists could be distributed across India.
3. The Tribunal had treated that evidence in unduly dismissive terms. Dr Mahmood was a respected and well-informed academic, and the uncontradicted material deriving from her was sufficient to establish the facts stated in it. The approach in Karanakaran required all material considerations to be taken into account when assessing future risk, without applying ordinary civil rules of proof.
4. That conclusion did not determine the appeal. The evidence had to be assessed as a whole. The appellant had been arrested once, released without charge after two days, had lived in Delhi for more than a year without difficulty, obtained a passport in his own name and was not pursued to Delhi. The Special Adjudicator had made no positive finding that an arrest warrant remained outstanding.
5. The appellant therefore had not established, even to the appropriate asylum standard, that he was a history-sheeter or habitual offender within the relevant categories, or that identification at Delhi airport would create a reasonable likelihood that he would be persecuted for a Convention reason or denied a fair trial. The appeal was dismissed, with the appellant’s costs to be assessed by the Legal Services Commission.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — Appeal dismissed on 4 April 2001.
• Immigration Appeal Tribunal — Appeal dismissed; permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal was refused.
• Special Adjudicator — Appeal against refusal of asylum dismissed; determination sent on 28 April 2000.
• Secretary of State for the Home Department — Asylum claim refused on 7 December 1998.