Ibrahim, R (on the application) v Secretary Of State For the Home Department

Under section 11 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, a member State accepted as responsible under standing arrangements is deemed to be a safe third country. A removal certificate cannot be challenged merely by asserting that the member State is not in fact safe.

A human-rights appeal under section 65 requires an allegation of breach to have been made. The Secretary of State need not invite such an allegation in advance. A late assertion of persecution by non-state agents did not retrospectively invalidate the certificate or create an in-country appeal right.

The applicant, a Sudanese national, claimed asylum in the United Kingdom after arriving from Abu Dhabi with a French Schengen visa. France accepted responsibility under the Dublin Convention. The Secretary of State certified under section 11(2)(a) of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 that the applicant could be removed to France.

Permission to apply for judicial review was refused by Moses J and, on renewal, by Scott Baker J. The applicant sought permission to appeal on two new grounds: that the Secretary of State had considered the safety of France inconsistently with Adan, and that the decision letter wrongly stated that an appeal could be exercised only from abroad.

1. Application refused. The certificate of 22 November 2000 disclosed no proper legal error.
2. Section 11(1) of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 required France, as a member State covered by standing arrangements, to be regarded as a place where the applicant’s life and liberty were not threatened and from which he would not be sent elsewhere contrary to the Refugee Convention. The Secretary of State was not required to certify in every case, but, once he certified, the certificate could not be impugned on the ground that France was not properly to be regarded as safe.
3. The reference in the decision letter to the Secretary of State’s opinion that the French authorities would comply with their Convention obligations was superfluous. In any event, the applicant’s case at the relevant date concerned alleged persecution by the Sudanese Government, not persecution by non-state agents. The later assertion of non-state persecution could not invalidate the certificate when issued.
4. Regulation 4(4) of the Immigration and Asylum Notices Regulations 2000 required the relevant human-rights allegation to be made. There was no basis for deeming such an allegation to have been made from the general circumstances in Sudan or from the Secretary of State’s knowledge of them.
5. The decision letter was therefore not misleading in explaining that the applicant had no appeal under section 65 while in the United Kingdom. If a human-rights allegation were later made, the Secretary of State could certify it under section 72(2)(a) as manifestly unfounded, and that certification would be amenable to judicial review.
6. Lord Justice Tuckey agreed that the regulation left no scope for deeming an allegation. Lord Justice Mance agreed with the reasoning of Lord Justice Simon Brown. The court made no decision on any future section 72(2)(a) certification.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Permission to appeal against Scott Baker J’s refusal of permission to apply for judicial review was refused.
• Queen’s Bench Division: Permission to apply for judicial review was initially refused by Moses J and refused again at a renewed oral hearing before Scott Baker J.