Assiimwe v Secretary Of State For The Home Department

Where an appellate tribunal bases its decision on an amnesty or other change in circumstances, the relevant legal position must be established at the date when the decision takes effect or is notified. A tribunal cannot rely on an enactment which had apparently expired by that date without evidence that its operation was lawfully extended. If the entire basis of the tribunal’s decision has thereby failed, the appellate court may quash the decision and restore the earlier determination rather than remit the matter for rehearing.

The appellant, a Ugandan national, had been granted asylum by a Special Adjudicator after findings that he had belonged to a rebel group, had been detained and ill-treated, and faced a serious possibility of persecution on return. The Secretary of State appealed to the Immigration Appeal Tribunal, relying on the Ugandan Amnesty Act 2000. The Tribunal accepted that the Act removed the appellant’s well-founded fear and allowed the Secretary of State’s appeal.

The Act came into force on 17 January 2000 and remained in force for no more than six months unless extended by statutory instrument. The Tribunal’s determination was notified on 20 July 2000. The central issue was whether the Tribunal had lawfully relied on the Act when there was no evidence that it remained in force at the date of notification.

1. Appeal allowed unanimously. The Immigration Appeal Tribunal’s decision was quashed, the Special Adjudicator’s decision granting asylum was restored, and the appellant was awarded his costs with legal aid.
2. The Tribunal’s determination depended entirely on the Ugandan Amnesty Act 2000 being in force. Under section 17, the Act remained in force for no more than six months from 17 January 2000 unless the Minister extended it by statutory instrument. On the face of the Act, it therefore ceased to operate on 16 July 2000.
3. The relevant date was the date on which the Tribunal’s determination was notified, namely 20 July 2000. At that time the Tribunal had no evidence that the Act had been extended. Information later obtained by the Secretary of State could not remedy the evidential deficiency because no fresh evidence had properly been placed before the court.
4. Since the legal foundation of the Tribunal’s decision had been undermined, the error was decisive. It was unnecessary to determine the wider questions concerning the evidential burden following a change of circumstances or the effect of an offered amnesty on an asylum claim.
5. Ward LJ considered that remittal would be inappropriate because the error went to the whole basis of the decision and the matter should be brought to an end. May LJ agreed, adding that the decision was particular to this case and should not be treated as guidance on other Ugandan amnesty cases. Rix LJ agreed with both judgments.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): allowed the appeal, quashed the Immigration Appeal Tribunal’s determination, restored the Special Adjudicator’s decision granting asylum, and awarded costs.
• Immigration Appeal Tribunal: allowed the Secretary of State’s appeal on the basis that the Ugandan Amnesty Act 2000 removed the appellant’s well-founded fear of persecution.
• Special Adjudicator: accepted the appellant’s evidence and granted asylum after finding a serious possibility of persecution on return to Uganda.