Jones v Johnson

An appellate court should not require findings of fact to be expressed with every conceivable detail if the judgment makes its fundamental findings clear, explains the evidential preferences that determine the result, and permits the decision to be understood. Detailed findings may be desirable, but a counsel of perfection is not the governing standard. An appeal is not an opportunity for a second trial merely because a party hopes that another judge will assess the evidence differently. A trial judge may draw reasonable adverse conclusions from the evidence, including the presentation of an exaggerated claim and the failure to call a claimant, provided those conclusions are grounded in the evidence.

The claimant, who had sustained serious injuries in a road traffic accident, sought further permission to appeal against a damages decision by His Honour Judge Cracknell in the Queen's Bench Division. Permission had already been granted in relation to allegedly inadequate general damages. The renewed application concerned future loss of earnings, earning capacity and care costs.

The claimant argued that the judgment lacked transparency, relying principally on Flannery v Halifax Estate Agencies Limited [2000] 1 All ER 373, and that the judge had drawn improper adverse inferences from the evidence and from the claimant's failure to testify. The central issue was whether the judge's reasons and evidential conclusions were legally inadequate.

1. Further permission to appeal refused. The judge's award of general damages was already subject to an appeal, but the remaining grounds disclosed no real prospect of success.

2. The judgment adequately explained the conclusions on future earnings and care. The judge made clear findings about the claimant's pre-accident condition, his post-accident presentation, the family evidence and the competing expert opinions. He explained why he preferred the defendant's experts and was entitled to conclude that the accident had not materially worsened the claimant's capacity for independent living or his position in the employment market.

3. The requirement for adequate reasons does not demand a comprehensive finding on every suggested factual sub-issue. The proposed detailed findings about prognosis, continuing symptoms, earning capacity and malingering represented a counsel of perfection. The judge's fundamental findings were sufficiently clear to explain the decision.

4. The judge was entitled to comment adversely on the substantial future-care claim because it was based on family evidence which he viewed unfavourably. He was also entitled to question why the claimant had not been called, despite the expert's evidence, after viewing a video which suggested that the claimant could behave normally and perform ordinary tasks.

5. The application was not a proper basis for ordering a second trial before a different judge in the hope of obtaining a different factual assessment. The order was: further permission to appeal refused, with no order for costs.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Further permission to appeal refused. The appeal concerning general damages had already received permission and was not determined by this application.
• Queen's Bench Division, Sheffield District Registry: His Honour Judge Cracknell, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, gave judgment on 19 December 2000 and made the relevant order on 19 January 2001.