Lewy v Lord Chancellor's Department

Permission to seek judicial review requires an arguable public-law case. A prolonged correspondence campaign cannot convert dissatisfaction with administrative replies into a justiciable claim where no recognised public-law ground is identified. Nor does payment of court fees create an implied contractual right to answers from the court service or the Lord Chancellor’s Department. A statutory time limit for complaints is not open to challenge merely because a different limitation period applies to contractual claims. Permission to use a tape recorder in court remains a matter of judicial discretion, not an entitlement available in every case.

The claimant challenged the refusal of the Lord Chancellor’s Department to provide further answers concerning the Legal Services Ombudsman’s three-month time limit, the handling of her complaints, and other matters. Silber J refused permission on the papers. Owen J subsequently heard oral submissions and agreed that there was no arguable case. The claimant sought permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal, also raising alleged contractual rights, human-rights arguments, court recording, and the work of judicial assistants.

1. Application refused. Laws LJ refused permission to appeal because the proposed judicial-review claim disclosed no arguable case.
2. The correspondence showed dissatisfaction with the Department’s responses, but no sustainable allegation of fraud or other recognised public-law error. The suggestion that court fees created an implied contract imposing duties on the Department or the Royal Courts of Justice had no legal foundation. The Court User’s Charter did not alter that conclusion.
3. The three-month period governing complaints to the Legal Services Ombudsman was beyond sensible legal challenge on the material advanced. The fact that contractual claims might have a longer limitation period did not establish any relevant legal objection.
4. The court’s discretion concerning tape recorders was described in the Practice Direction (Tape Recorders) as unlimited, subject to relevant factors including reasonable need. There was no basis for permission in this case, and granting it here would not mean that permission should ordinarily be granted whenever requested.
5. The applicant’s criticisms of judicial assistants were misplaced. Their work assists the court and litigants, including litigants in person. The order was: application refused.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Laws LJ refused permission to appeal from the decision of Owen J.
• High Court, Queen’s Bench Division: Owen J refused permission to seek judicial review on 29 August 2000, agreeing with Silber J’s earlier refusal on the papers.