Rhys-Harper v Relaxion Group plc (Relaxion Group plc v Rhys-Harper)

Section 6(2) of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 applies to acts or events occurring during the actual employment relationship. The words referring to a woman employed by the respondent mean a current employee, not a former employee.

Accordingly, the provision does not confer jurisdiction over a separate complaint made after termination about harassment during employment or the employer’s later handling of that complaint. Community-law principles cannot justify distorting clear statutory language. Coote concerned effective judicial protection against post-termination victimisation for bringing equal-treatment proceedings and did not extend to this different kind of complaint.

Christine Rhys-Harper appealed from the Employment Appeal Tribunal, which had allowed Relaxion Group plc’s appeal against an Employment Tribunal decision of 16 April 1999. She had been employed at Helston Sports Centre from November 1997 until autumn 1998. After a disciplinary hearing, she was dismissed on 15 October 1998. She complained of sexual harassment by the manager on 9 November, after the contract had ended. The employers investigated and rejected the allegation.

The EAT treated the complaint as a separate free-standing complaint and held that the contract had ended no later than 22 October. The central issue before the Court of Appeal was whether section 6(2) of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 gave jurisdiction over that complaint.

1. Disposition. Pill LJ gave the leading judgment. Buxton LJ delivered a concurring judgment and Mantell LJ agreed. The appeal was unanimously dismissed with costs, and permission to appeal was refused. A separate extension-of-time issue was accepted as requiring consideration on remittal.
2. Statutory construction. Section 6(2) of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 does not extend to acts or events occurring after termination. The natural meaning of a woman employed by the respondent is a woman currently employed by that respondent. The provision is directed to conduct during the actual employment relationship.
3. The substantially similar wording of section 6(2) and section 4(2) of the Race Relations Act 1976 should be construed consistently. The decision in Post Office v Adekeye [1997] ICR 110 therefore bound the EAT and carried the same authority in relation to section 6(2). The wording concerning access to promotion, transfer, training, benefits, facilities and services strongly indicated conduct during employment. The different use of the pronoun in the two Acts did not justify different meanings.
4. Community law. Domestic legislation should be construed consistently with an applicable directive where that can be done without distorting its meaning, applying Webb v Emo [1993] ICR 175. The clear construction of section 6(2) could not be displaced by the Equal Treatment Directive or Article 141 of the Treaty.
5. Coote v Granada Hospitality Ltd [1999] ICR 100 was narrow. It required effective judicial protection against a former employer’s post-termination refusal to provide a reference in retaliation for proceedings enforcing equal treatment. It did not address, and could not extend relief to, a separate complaint initiated only after employment had ended. The victimisation principle was distinct from the alleged discrimination under section 6(2).
6. The authorities concerning pay and post-retirement benefits, including Garland v British Rail Engineering Ltd [1982] ICR 420, addressed a different statutory and factual context. They did not support jurisdiction over a post-termination complaint about harassment.

• Court of Appeal: The employee’s appeal from the EAT was dismissed with costs. Permission to appeal was refused.
• Employment Appeal Tribunal: Allowed the employers’ appeal against the Employment Tribunal decision and held that the post-termination complaint fell outside section 6(2) of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975.
• Employment Tribunal: Decision given on 16 April 1999. The judgment does not set out the tribunal’s full orders.