Orchid Properties Ltd (A Firm) v Sawadi

A second-tier appeal to the Court of Appeal requires an important point of principle or practice, or another compelling reason, under the Access to Justice Act 1999. A claim seeking to set aside a judgment for fraud must identify the alleged fraud clearly and precisely; fraud must then be strictly proved. A pleading consisting of unexplained general allegations, which gives defendants no comprehensible case to answer, may be struck out. Concurrent lower-court decisions and an apparent attempt to reopen concluded litigation do not satisfy the statutory gateway.

Orchid, an Isle of Man company restored to the register shortly before proceedings, commenced an action on 13 April 2000 against three defendants. It sought to set aside for fraud an order made by His Honour Judge Howarth on 1 May 1996 after a full trial of two joined actions, although Orchid had not been a party to them and its pleading did not explain their parties or issues.

Deputy District Judge Gregory struck out the action on 18 August 2000. His Honour Judge Maddocks made an order on 26 January 2001, amended on 5 March 2001, apparently refusing permission to appeal, although its precise effect was uncertain. The central issue was whether the Court of Appeal could and should grant permission and an extension of time under the second-tier appeal threshold.

Application dismissed. Lord Justice Robert Walker treated the matter as an admissible application for permission to appeal and an extension of time, despite doubt about whether Judge Maddocks had dismissed an appeal or refused permission. The amended order appeared to produce the latter result, which would ordinarily leave no jurisdiction for a further permission application. The court proceeded on the assumption of admissibility to avoid uncertainty.

1. Section 55 of the Access to Justice Act 1999 imposes a demanding threshold. A second-tier appeal may be heard only where it raises an important point of principle or practice, or where there is some other compelling reason. The application satisfied neither limb and would have failed even under a less demanding test.
2. A fraud claim seeking to set aside a judgment is serious. The alleged fraud must be precisely pleaded and strictly proved. The pleading here was merely a series of allegations, without a clear or comprehensible basis on which the defendants could properly respond. Amendment was not feasible.
3. The conclusion was reinforced by the fact that Orchid had not been a party to the earlier proceedings, its claim did not explain the earlier parties or issues, and it appeared to be an attempt to relitigate litigation concluded after a full trial.
4. The application was dismissed. There was no order for costs.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On 27 April 2001, the court treated the matter as an admissible application but dismissed it under the second-tier appeal threshold.
• Chancery Division, Manchester District: His Honour Judge Maddocks made an order on 26 January 2001, amended on 5 March 2001, apparently refusing permission to appeal from the strike-out decision.
• Deputy District Judge: On 18 August 2000, Deputy District Judge Gregory struck out Orchid’s action.