Baldwin v Riley

Permission for a second appeal is available only where the case raises an important point of principle or there is some other compelling reason. A decision whether to adjourn is pre-eminently a case-management decision involving discretion. Where late-served expert evidence is disclosed at the hearing, and neither the party nor the expert seeks more time or indicates an inability to proceed, the judge need not order a further adjournment of the judge’s own motion. Section 6 of the Human Rights Act does not make an adjournment imperative in those circumstances. The proposed appeal therefore had almost no prospect of success and did not satisfy the statutory threshold.

The supplier claimed the unpaid balance for three hardwood windows in the Worcester County Court. The defendant alleged that the windows were not of satisfactory quality and counterclaimed for the cost of replacements. At trial, the claimant’s expert report had not been served on the defendant as directed. The district judge allowed about 20 minutes for the defendant and his expert to read it, then proceeded when no further adjournment was requested. Judgment was entered against the defendant. His appeal to the circuit judge was dismissed on the basis that he should have sought an adjournment. He applied for permission to bring a second appeal, relying on the procedural irregularity, alleged unequal case management and section 6 of the Human Rights Act. The central issue was whether the district judge should have adjourned without an application.

Mr Justice Lloyd delivered the judgment, and Lord Justice Judge agreed. The application for permission to bring a second appeal was dismissed.

1. Under section 55 of the Access to Justice Act 1999, a second appeal could proceed only if it raised an important point of principle or there was some other compelling reason. The proposed appeal satisfied neither limb.
2. The decision whether to adjourn a hearing was pre-eminently a case-management decision. Its discretionary character was especially relevant in a small claim which had already been before the court on several occasions.
3. The claimant’s expert report had been disclosed late, but the district judge adjourned for approximately 20 minutes so that the defendant and his expert could read it. Neither indicated that they were unable properly to deal with the report, and neither requested a further adjournment. In those circumstances, the judge was not required to adjourn the case of his own motion.
4. The fact that the defendant appeared in person did not alter the analysis. The judge could reasonably proceed once satisfied that the defendant was content to continue. The circuit judge was entitled to conclude that the defendant should have sought an adjournment if one was needed.
5. The argument based on section 6 of the Human Rights Act did not make an adjournment imperative in the absence of an application or indication that further time was required. Even apart from section 55, the proposed appeal had almost no prospect of success because it challenged the exercise of a case-management discretion. Application dismissed.

1. Worcester County Court: District Judge MacKenzie entered judgment against the defendant following the trial of the claim and counterclaim.
2. Worcester County Court: His Honour Judge Geddes dismissed the defendant’s appeal, holding that he or his expert should have sought an adjournment if further time was required.
3. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Lloyd J, with Judge LJ agreeing, dismissed the application for permission to bring a second appeal.