Cornwall Gardens PTE Limited v R O Garrard & Co Ltd & Christie Owen & Davies Plc

For limitation purposes, a cause of action is identified by the factual situation giving rise to the remedy. Different legal labels do not create separate causes of action where the underlying facts are the same.

Facts amounting to malicious falsehood remain subject to section 4A of the Limitation Act 1980, even where they are pleaded as wrongful interference with rights or include special damage. The discretion to extend time requires a satisfactory explanation for delay and consideration of all relevant circumstances, including prejudice and the apparent strength of the claim.

The claimant property developer alleged that the defendants had falsely asserted rights of way over land forming part of a hotel development. It brought claims for malicious falsehood and wrongful interference with rights, later seeking amendments alleging fraud and tortious conspiracy.

The Cardiff Mercantile Court held that both claims were time-barred under section 4A of the Limitation Act 1980, refused an extension of time under section 32A, and entered judgment for the defendants. The claimant appealed and sought permission to amend. The central issues were whether the wrongful-interference claim was distinct from malicious falsehood, whether time should be extended, and whether the proposed amendments should be permitted.

1. Appeal dismissed. Lord Phillips MR gave the leading judgment. Lord Justice Chadwick and Lord Justice Pill agreed. The orders refusing an extension of time and refusing permission to amend were upheld, with costs.
2. Under section 4A of the Limitation Act 1980, the court must examine the facts pleaded rather than the label attached to the claim. The same factual situation may have more than one apt description, but that does not create more than one cause of action. The facts relied upon for wrongful interference with rights were the same as those relied upon for malicious falsehood, apart from the allegation of damage. They therefore fell within other malicious falsehood and were subject to the one-year limitation period.
3. The absence of a need to plead or prove special damage under sections 2 and 3(1) of the Defamation Act 1952 did not mean that proof of such damage transformed the tort into a different cause of action.
4. The discretion under section 32A of the Limitation Act 1980 is equitable and requires consideration of all the circumstances, particularly the length and reasons for delay, when relevant facts became known, promptness thereafter, evidential prejudice, and the comparative prejudice to the parties. The claimant had known the material facts from the outset. A change of solicitors and the failure of former solicitors to advise on a possible claim did not adequately explain the delay. The absence of prejudice to the defendants was only one factor. The evidence also disclosed no substantial basis for alleging that the defendants knew their right-of-way assertion was false or were recklessly indifferent to its truth.
5. The proposed amendment alleging fraudulent recklessness added no material feature to the malicious-falsehood claim and could not avoid section 4A. The court noted that [2000] 2 All ER 271 recognised that an unlawful-means conspiracy does not necessarily merge in an underlying tort, but expressly left open whether the proposed conspiracy claim would escape the limitation period. In the circumstances, the amendment added nothing significant and would confer an illegitimate advantage by evading the statutory period.
6. The court endorsed professional guidance concerning allegations of fraud and emphasised its application to malicious falsehood. That observation was additional to the decision, and the merits of the pleaded malicious-falsehood claim were not determined.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — Appeal dismissed on 9 May 2001. The court upheld the refusal of an extension of time and refused the proposed amendments.
2. Cardiff Mercantile Court — His Honour Judge Chambers QC held on 20 July 2000 that the malicious-falsehood and wrongful-interference claims were time-barred, refused an extension under section 32A of the Limitation Act 1980, and entered judgment for Christie & Co. Judgment was later entered for Garrard & Co by consent.