Meghnagi v London Borough Of Hackney & Anor

A compulsory purchase order may be challenged only by the statutory application made within the prescribed six-week period. The time limit is unextendable, and the order cannot be questioned through other legal proceedings. The statutory scheme may be tempered in exceptional circumstances where conscience or justice requires it, but that principle does not assist an owner who failed to receive notices because he had not supplied an up-to-date address. A defective advertisement will not justify relief without conceivable prejudice. Complaints about the merits of the acquisition fall outside judicial review.

The applicant sought permission to appeal against Turner J’s refusal on 18 January 2001 of permission to apply for judicial review. The proposed challenge concerned a compulsory purchase order and general vesting declaration relating to his property.

He alleged that statutory notices had not been received and sought to add further grounds concerning a defective advertisement, contradictory reasons, the compatibility of the statutory time limit with the Human Rights Act 1998, and alleged forgery. The central issue was whether any of those matters disclosed an arguable basis for judicial review despite the statutory six-week limit.

1. Permission refused. The proposed appeal could not succeed on the original grounds or on the additional grounds canvassed.
2. Sections 23 and 25 of the Acquisition of Land Act 1981 required any challenge to be made by statutory application within an unextendable six-week period. Section 25 prevented the compulsory purchase order from being questioned in any other form of legal proceedings. The strictness of that scheme was established in Smith v East Elloe [1956] AC 736 and R v Secretary of State ex parte Ostler [1977] QB 122.
3. The possible tempering of that strictness recognised in R v Carmarthen District Council ex parte Blewin Trust Ltd and Another [1990] 1 EGLR 29 did not assist the applicant. That possibility concerned a materially different situation in which a later scheme was wholly different from the scheme originally considered, depriving objectors of an opportunity to make objections. It did not apply where notices were not received because the owner had failed to provide an up-to-date address.
4. Service had complied with sections 6, 12 and 15 of the Acquisition of Land Act 1981, including service at the property and the applicant’s last known address. The applicant’s actual non-receipt therefore did not establish a legal defect.
5. The defective advertisement caused no conceivable prejudice because it identified the property and there was no suggestion that a compliant advertisement would have produced a different result. The proposed reinstatement of the property concerned the merits of the acquisition, not a legal ground of challenge. The Human Rights Act 1998 point disclosed no arguable objection to the six-week limit, particularly in view of the qualification recognised in Blewin Trust. The forgery allegation was speculative and unsupported.

• High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division, Administrative Court: Turner J refused permission to apply for judicial review on 18 January 2001.
• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The application for permission to appeal was refused.