Tan v Slot

An application to reinstate a permission-to-appeal application dismissed for non-attendance will not ordinarily be revived after serious delay. The applicant must provide a satisfactory explanation for both the failure to attend and the delay in seeking reinstatement. The court must assess fairness between the parties, including prejudice to the respondent whose case was treated as concluded. Revival after so long a period requires exceptional circumstances.

Mrs Anne Slot sought to reinstate an application for permission to appeal against orders made in litigation with Miss Lina Tan. The Guilford County Court had dismissed Mrs Slot’s appeal against a district judge’s order directing arbitration, requiring disclosure and striking out her counterclaim for damages for time, stress and worry. The county court judge also refused amendments to add her husband as a party and plead abuse of civil process and malicious falsehood.

Mrs Slot’s application for permission to appeal was dismissed for non-attendance on 10 February 1999. After further correspondence and substantial delay, she applied for reinstatement in April 2000. The central issue was whether her explanation justified reviving the application and whether reinstatement would be fair between the parties.

Lord Justice Mummery, sitting alone, refused the application to reinstate the permission-to-appeal application.

1. The applicant had not provided a satisfactory explanation, either in the papers or orally, for the serious delay in pursuing reinstatement. The application for permission had been dismissed more than two years earlier.
2. The fact that matters had been left in the hands of Mr Peters did not adequately explain the failure to attend the February 1999 hearing. He had neither attended nor arranged for another person to appear. There had also been a further serious delay before the reinstatement application was pursued.
3. Reinstatement had to be considered fairly as between the parties. Mrs Slot’s assertion that Mrs Tan would suffer no prejudice was insufficient. Revival would subject Mrs Tan to the prejudice of having litigation treated as concluded for two years brought back to life.
4. Since the civil procedure rules had come into force, procedural matters had to proceed in accordance with the rules. Exceptional circumstances were required before an application dismissed so long previously, followed by such delay, could be revived.

No exceptional circumstances had been shown. It was therefore not fair or just to reinstate the application. The application was refused.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On 15 May 2001, the application to reinstate the permission-to-appeal application was refused. The earlier permission application had been dismissed for non-attendance on 10 February 1999.
2. Guilford County Court: On 3 June 1998, His Honour Judge Sleeman dismissed Mrs Slot’s appeal against the district judge’s order and refused permission to appeal.
3. District Judge, Guilford County Court: On 3 December 1997, the matter was directed to arbitration, disclosure was ordered and Mrs Slot’s counterclaim for damages for time, stress and worry was struck out.