Bright v Pittock

Permission to appeal should be refused where the proposed grounds disclose no real prospect of an appeal when considered in the context of the case as a whole. Complaints about self-representation, trial management and evidential rulings will not justify an appeal unless they materially affected the decision. Where a party is absent when a witness gives evidence, continuation without cross-examination may be problematic if that evidence is crucial or there is a serious unresolved disagreement between experts. It does not establish a real prospect of appeal where the judge decides the material issues on other evidence and the absent witness’s evidence is not crucial.

Bright v Pittock concerned an application for permission to appeal from a decision of the Canterbury County Court on 10 October 2000. Mrs Bright claimed damages for whiplash injuries sustained in a road accident involving Mr Pittock, shortly after an earlier accident involving a Parcel Force vehicle. The trial judge awarded her slightly more than £9,000, but rejected the claim that her continuing disability was caused by the second accident.

Mrs Bright, who had represented herself at trial, raised eight complaints concerning representation, preparation, trial conduct, medical evidence and the continuation of the hearing during her illness. The central issue was whether those matters, particularly her inability to cross-examine an orthopaedic surgeon who gave evidence in her absence, gave rise to a real prospect of appeal.

Permission to appeal was refused. Lord Justice Longmore considered the complaints in the context of the case as a whole.

1. The complaints concerning self-representation, preparation of the trial bundle, the judge’s conduct, the presence of the defendant’s psychologist, alleged factual errors and the treatment of medical evidence were insufficient to show any real prospect of appeal. The trial judge had considered the substantial medical evidence carefully and had recognised that Mrs Bright had represented herself with some skill.
2. The refusal to adjourn when Mrs Bright was ill and unable to cross-examine Dr Taor required closer consideration. The timing of the trial had been arranged around the availability of several medical witnesses, and an adjournment would have caused a lengthy delay.
3. The judge’s decision did not depend on Dr Taor’s evidence. Although there were differences between Dr Taor and Mr Noordeen, the trial judge accepted Mr Noordeen’s view on the relative significance of the two accidents and resolved the case principally by reference to video evidence, assisted by evidence from other doctors. Dr Taor’s evidence was therefore not crucial to the decision.
4. Longmore LJ observed that, if there had been a serious disagreement between the doctors which required cross-examination of the absent witness, the judge could not have continued. On the facts found, however, the inability to cross-examine Dr Taor did not cause material unfairness sufficient to create a real prospect of appeal.

The refusal of permission said nothing about any separate complaint Mrs Bright might have had against her former solicitors.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On 16 May 2001, Lord Justice Longmore refused Mrs Bright permission to appeal.
2. Canterbury County Court: His Honour Judge Poulton, on 10 October 2000, awarded Mrs Bright slightly more than £9,000 for whiplash injuries but rejected the contention that her continuing disability was caused by the accident involving Mr Pittock.