London Borough of Hackney v Ekinci

The statutory priority for persons with dependent children is directed to the parent-child relationship, broadly understood. It does not extend to an applicant whose dependent spouse is under 18 and therefore falls within an extended guidance definition of “child”. The fact that a person may be both a child and a spouse does not make the person a dependent child in the spousal relationship. Article 8 does not confer a right to housing or require such an applicant to receive priority over applicants with adult spouses or other homeless applicants. Parliament may establish housing priorities reflecting vulnerability and limited resources.

The local housing authority decided that Mr Ekinci did not have a priority need under section 189 of the Housing Act 1996. His wife was 17, in full-time education and dependent on him. The county court allowed his appeal, holding that she was a dependent child for the purposes of section 189(1)(b), and relied also on Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The central issue was whether a dependent spouse who falls within the extended meaning of “child” can constitute a dependent child under the statutory priority scheme.

1. The appeal was allowed. The order of His Honour Judge Graham QC was set aside. There was no order as to costs, subject to detailed assessment of the funded client’s costs.
2. Section 189 of the Housing Act 1996 creates priorities among homeless applicants for interim accommodation. Section 189(1)(b) is concerned with the parent-child relationship, broadly defined. It does not cover an applicant whose dependent spouse happens to fall within the extended guidance definition of “child”.
3. The definition of “child” may include a person aged 16 to 18 who is in full-time education or otherwise unable to support herself. That does not determine whether the person is a “dependent child” in every relationship. Mrs Ekinci could be a dependent child in relation to her parents or a person in a quasi-parental position, but not in relation to her husband, because in that relationship she was his wife.
4. The purpose of the provision was to identify, among homeless persons, those having priority over others. The existence of limited housing resources and the need to balance the claims of different groups supported a narrow construction. Section 167(2) of the Housing Act 1996, concerning reasonable preference for families with dependent children, reinforced the conclusion that the expression should bear the same meaning in the two statutory contexts.
5. Article 8 did not alter the result. It does not confer a right to be provided with a home. Parliament was entitled to establish a scheme of priorities which took account of vulnerability and competing claims on limited resources. The court’s construction of that scheme did not fail to respect family life.
6. The court added that, if Article 8(1) had been engaged, the scheme and its judicial interpretation would have been justified as necessary for the economic well-being of the country and the protection of other applicants.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Appeal from the decision of Shoreditch County Court dated 4 July 2000. Appeal allowed and the county court order set aside.