Haddadi v Secretary of State for the Home Department

On an appeal from the Immigration Appeal Tribunal, the Court of Appeal should not interfere with an assessment of future risk merely because it might have viewed the evidence differently. Intervention is justified only where the tribunal’s conclusion was one that no reasonable tribunal, properly directing itself and considering the material, could have reached.

In assessing an asylum claim based on perceived terrorist involvement, the tribunal may consider whether the authorities would distinguish coercion from willing support. Relevant evidence includes the treatment of similarly situated persons and any subsequent events indicating the authorities’ likely conduct. A conclusion that questioning would reveal the claimant’s coercion was open to the tribunal where there was no evidence that comparable traders, or the claimant’s business partner, had suffered persecutory ill-treatment.

An Algerian citizen claimed asylum after armed Islamic groups extorted regular payments from his poultry business. He feared both the groups and the Algerian authorities, who had sought to question him about the payments. The special adjudicator accepted his general credibility but found no real likelihood of persecutory ill-treatment by the authorities. The Immigration Appeal Tribunal dismissed his appeal, concluding that questioning could establish that he had been coerced rather than sympathised with the armed groups.

The claimant appealed to the Court of Appeal with permission. The central issue was whether the lower tribunals’ assessment of the risk on return was irrational or otherwise outside the range of conclusions reasonably open to them.

1. Appeal dismissed. The Court of Appeal declined to interfere with the decisions of the special adjudicator and the Immigration Appeal Tribunal.
2. Per Lord Justice Latham, the appellant accepted that he had to show that the conclusions below were conclusions to which no reasonable tribunal, properly directing itself and properly considering the material, could have come. The court treated the issue as one involving the assessment of facts and future risk by the experienced tribunal entrusted with the jurisdiction.
3. The tribunal was entitled to take account of the fact that the appellant had admitted making payments to armed Islamic groups, while also considering the perception the Algerian authorities were likely to have of him. It was open to the tribunal to conclude that the authorities could establish through questioning that he was a victim of extortion rather than a sympathiser, particularly because there was no evidence that the other traders who had been detained had suffered persecutory ill-treatment.
4. The absence of evidence concerning the appellant’s business partner was also significant. Nothing suggested that the partner had suffered ill-treatment or other conduct capable of supporting a well-founded fear of persecution. The appellant’s account of coercion had some objective support because the country material showed that militant groups habitually extorted money in that manner.
5. Although the lower tribunals’ approach might be regarded as benevolent, their conclusions were not irrational or perverse. They were conclusions that a reasonable tribunal could reach on the evidence. The order was: appeal dismissed.

• Immigration Appeal Tribunal: dismissed the appeal on 3 October 2000, holding that there was no real likelihood that the appellant would suffer persecutory ill-treatment on return.
• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): dismissed the appeal on 4 May 2001. The court held that the lower tribunals’ conclusions were not irrational or perverse and declined to interfere with their assessment of the evidence.