The Queen v Hestview Limited (t/a Surrey Racing)

Under paragraph 19(b)(ii) of the First Schedule to the Betting Gaming and Lotteries Act 1963, the decision-maker must consider local demand for betting-office facilities and the number of existing offices available to meet it. If granting a licence would be inexpedient on that basis, paragraph 20 leaves a discretion whether to refuse it. Profitability evidence is relevant because it indicates demand. Strong demand may support an inference that existing facilities do not fully meet it, even if demand might not sustain every competing office. Reasons need not address every evidential indicator in detail where the losing party can understand why it lost. The wider public interest may have some role, but the precise stage at which it arises was left open.

Surrey Racing sought judicial review of the Snaresbrook Crown Court’s decision to grant Chase a new betting-office licence at 6–8 High Street, East Ham. The licensing justices had refused Chase’s application but granted Surrey Racing a licence at 20 High Street, subject to surrender of another licence. The Crown Court allowed Chase’s appeal and granted the licence. Hooper J dismissed Surrey Racing’s judicial-review claim. Surrey Racing renewed its application for permission to appeal, arguing that the Crown Court had considered irrelevant matters, failed to determine whether existing supply met demand, and gave inadequate reasons. The central issue was the proper application of the statutory demand and licensing provisions.

Application refused. The Crown Court’s decision was not unlawful and there was no order for costs.

1. The statutory scheme in the First Schedule to the Betting Gaming and Lotteries Act 1963 requires a decision-maker first to consider whether granting or renewing a licence would be inexpedient having regard to local demand for betting-office facilities and the number of offices available to meet that demand. If that conclusion is reached, the decision-maker retains a discretion whether to refuse the licence under paragraph 19, notwithstanding the general direction in paragraph 20 that licences should be granted.
2. Profitability was a relevant consideration. It was an indicator of demand, and both parties had adduced evidence about profits on that basis. The Crown Court was therefore entitled to consider the competing profit forecasts, although its reference to ultimate viability was unnecessary.
3. The Crown Court found strong demand and identified the two existing offices available to meet it. Its view that there was a possibility that demand would not sustain both offices was consistent with an assessment that demand was probably not fully met by existing facilities. The court made a clear finding that granting the licence was not inexpedient.
4. The wider public interest might have a role either in assessing expediency or in exercising the discretion, but the precise position was left open. In any event, consideration of the absence of adverse effects on the betting or general public could not prejudice Surrey Racing.
5. The Crown Court did not address every further indicator of demand relied on by Surrey Racing. That omission did not establish inadequate reasons because Surrey Racing could not have been in doubt why its case failed.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Lord Justice Tuckey refused the renewed application for permission to appeal.
• Administrative Court: Hooper J dismissed Surrey Racing’s claim for judicial review of the Snaresbrook Crown Court’s licensing decision.
• Snaresbrook Crown Court: Allowed Chase’s appeal from the licensing justices and granted the new betting-office licence.