Marya v Lord Chancellor's Department

Judicial immunity bars a damages claim against a judge for making a judicial order, even where the claimant alleges that the order was legally wrong. The immunity cannot be bypassed by suing the judge’s employing department.

Vicarious liability is derivative. An employer is liable only where the employee has committed an actionable wrong for which damages are recoverable. If the judge is immune from liability, the department cannot be vicariously liable for the same act. A claim founded solely on that route is misconceived and has no realistic prospect of success.

The applicant challenged a bankruptcy order made by District Judge Dimmick in proceedings initiated by Southall Properties Limited. He initially brought proceedings against the judge, alleging unlawfulness and seeking damages. After those proceedings were struck out, he sought to amend them so as to proceed against the Lord Chancellor’s Department on the basis that it employed the judge.

Gray J treated the claim as misconceived and refused permission to appeal against the striking-out order. The Court of Appeal considered whether the proposed claim could succeed through vicarious liability despite the judge’s immunity.

Permission to appeal was refused. Lady Justice Arden held that there was no realistic prospect of success in an appeal against Gray J’s order.

1. Members of the judiciary are immune from damages actions of this nature arising from the exercise of judicial functions. The applicant accepted that District Judge Dimmick was immune from the proposed claim, even though the bankruptcy order was alleged to have been legally wrong.
2. Vicarious liability is derivative. A master or employer is liable for a servant’s act only where the servant has committed a wrong for which damages are payable. The Lord Chancellor’s Department therefore could not be liable for the judge’s conduct when the judge himself was not liable in damages.
3. The proposed amendment could not circumvent judicial immunity. The claim against the Department was consequently wholly misconceived, and Gray J was entitled to refuse permission to appeal.
4. Because solicitors had only just been instructed and the matter had come on sooner than anticipated, the applicant was given liberty to seek reinstatement within 14 days. Any such application had to be made by solicitors or counsel and demonstrate that the court had overlooked a material matter. This procedural opportunity did not amount to permission to appeal.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Lady Justice Arden refused permission to appeal, while allowing an application for reinstatement within 14 days if an overlooked matter could be demonstrated.
• High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division: Gray J, on 19 January 2001, treated the claim as wholly misconceived and refused permission to appeal against the striking-out order.
• Earlier procedural stage: Master Eyre struck out the proceedings on 26 September 2000. An amendment to proceed against the Lord Chancellor’s Department was subsequently considered by Gray J.