Logothetis v Kadoori & Ors

For the valuation date under paragraph 1 of Schedule 13 to the Leasehold Reform, Housing & Urban Development Act 1993, the relevant terms must have been determined by agreement or by the tribunal. It was arguable that agreement meant a concluded, final and unqualified agreement, without necessarily requiring an enforceable contract. That issue did not need to be decided. Where the prior findings established no agreement on the terms of acquisition as a whole, the premium could not be separated from the other terms. Either all terms had been agreed, leaving nothing for the tribunal to determine, or none had been agreed, so the valuation date had not arisen. Permission to appeal was therefore refused.

The tenant claimed a new lease under Chapter II of the Leasehold Reform, Housing & Urban Development Act 1993. The Leasehold Valuation Tribunal adjourned her application after negotiations appeared to have reached an advanced stage. No lease was completed.

The County Court dismissed the tenant’s application for an order requiring the landlords to grant the lease. On appeal, the Recorder held that no final agreement had been reached for the purposes of section 48 and that the application was premature. The tenant then restored the matter before the Leasehold Valuation Tribunal, which fixed the valuation date as 29 May 1997. The President of the Lands Tribunal allowed the landlords’ appeal and fixed the date as 29 October 1999. The central issue before the Court of Appeal was whether the premium could be treated separately from the remaining terms when determining the valuation date.

Lord Justice Dyson refused permission to appeal. The proposed appeal could not affect the outcome on the particular facts, although the tenant’s statutory interpretation argument was arguable.

1. The County Court Recorder had held that the terms of acquisition were not finally agreed for the purposes of section 48(3) and section 48(6)(a), and that the application was therefore premature. The President treated that conclusion as creating an issue estoppel. The tenant accepted its relevance to whether the terms remained in dispute under section 48(1), but argued that it did not determine the valuation date under paragraph 1 of Schedule 13.
2. The court accepted that it was at least arguable that “agreement” in the Schedule 13 definition meant a concluded, final and unqualified agreement, without necessarily requiring a binding and enforceable contract. The distinction between the agreement required by section 48(3) and the agreement referred to in Schedule 13 was therefore not resolved.
3. That question was immaterial because the Recorder’s conclusion applied to all the terms of acquisition. No separate agreement could be established for the terms other than the premium. If the relevant correspondence amounted to agreement, it amounted to agreement on all terms, including the premium, leaving no matter for the Leasehold Valuation Tribunal to determine under section 48(1). If it did not amount to agreement on the premium, it did not amount to agreement on any of the other terms either.
4. On that basis, the valuation date had not occurred. The outcome of any appeal was inevitable on the facts, so the application for permission to appeal was refused.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On 5 June 2001, Lord Justice Dyson refused permission to appeal.
• Lands Tribunal: On 5 December 2000, the President, Mr George Bartlett QC, allowed the landlords’ appeal and fixed the valuation date as 29 October 1999.
• County Court: The deputy district judge dismissed the tenant’s application. On 29 June 1999, Recorder Behar dismissed the tenant’s appeal, holding that no final agreement had been reached and that the application was premature.
• Leasehold Valuation Tribunal: The tenant’s application was initially adjourned during negotiations. After no lease was completed, the tribunal determined the valuation date as 29 May 1997.