Re W (Children)

In care proceedings, welfare and risk should be assessed on the basis of criminal convictions that remain in force. A pending attempt to challenge guilty pleas does not require an adjournment where the risk to children is clear. Refusal of an adjournment is a discretionary case-management decision, particularly where delay threatens a young child’s placement and the litigant can present his case with assistance. Time limits apply to applications made out of time, and delay in determining young children’s futures is especially damaging. Permission to appeal should be refused where the welfare orders are not arguably plainly wrong and there is no realistic prospect of success.

A father sought an extension of time and permission to appeal against orders made by Her Honour Judge Eaglestone in the Manchester County Court on 13 July 2000 concerning his three sons. The judge made care orders in favour of the local authority and authorised refusal of contact between the children and their father, and between the youngest child and his mother. The care plans provided for long-term foster care for the older children and adoption for the youngest.

The threshold criteria under section 31 of the Children Act 1989 had been agreed. The father nevertheless disputed personal responsibility for harm, future risk, and the convictions for sexual offences to which he had pleaded guilty. The central issues were whether the delay and adjournment should have been permitted, whether the welfare and contact orders were plainly wrong, and whether the father had any realistic prospect of a successful appeal.

The applications for an extension of time and for permission to appeal were refused.

1. The agreed threshold criteria satisfied section 31 of the Children Act 1989. The judge was therefore required to determine what arrangements best served each child’s welfare.
2. The care court had to proceed on the basis that the father’s criminal convictions stood. His continuing attempts to challenge his guilty pleas did not justify postponing the welfare decision. The risk included the boys witnessing sexual abuse or being encouraged to participate in it. That risk was compounded by the father’s failure to acknowledge the conduct.
3. The refusal of an adjournment was plainly within the judge’s discretion. Delay was harmful to the children, particularly the youngest child, whose secure placement was urgent. The father was able to present his case, had assistance from the guardian ad litem, and his representatives had correctly assessed the prospects of resisting the applications.
4. There was no sufficient basis for interfering with family life under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The argument that the father presented no risk ignored the convictions and the welfare risks identified by the judge. The absence of evidence of physical ill health did not answer the wider risks of social, emotional and behavioural harm.
5. The care and contact orders could not be said to be plainly wrong. The father had no prospect of a successful appeal. The applications for permission to appeal and an extension of time were accordingly refused.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Lady Justice Hale refused the applications for an extension of time and permission to appeal.
• Manchester County Court: Her Honour Judge Eaglestone made care orders in favour of the local authority and authorised refusal of specified contact on 13 July 2000.