Alexander v Phillips Electronics UK Ltd

A stay of execution must be construed by reference to the order that granted it. A stay limited to execution by fi fa does not restrain bankruptcy proceedings, and a stay concerning specified costs orders does not extend to a later costs order. A court office letter recording the effect of an earlier order does not create an additional order unless its language clearly does so. A Court of Appeal officer’s jurisdiction under CPR 52.16(1) does not include making a stay of execution. Where repeated applications are meritless and threaten unjustified prolongation of litigation, the court may make a Grepe v Loam order requiring prior permission for further applications.

The appellant’s substantive action against the respondent company had been struck out by Master Eyre for disclosing no reasonable cause of action. Butterfield J dismissed the appeal and ordered payment of costs. The appellant was later made bankrupt on the basis of that costs order.

He sought annulment of the bankruptcy order under section 282(1)(a) of the Insolvency Act 1986, relying on a Master’s order staying execution by fi fa and a subsequent Court of Appeal office letter. Mr McCombe QC, sitting as a Deputy Judge of the Chancery Division, dismissed the appeal. The central issues were whether the stay or letter restrained the bankruptcy proceedings and whether there was any realistic basis for further appeals.

1. The applications for permission to appeal were refused. The original claim had been struck out and the orders under challenge were fully justified. The fresh evidence disclosed no arguable basis for setting aside the striking-out order.
2. The order made by Master Eyre on 17 February 2000 stayed execution by fi fa only. It concerned the costs orders made on 15 March 1999 and did not restrain proceedings under the bankruptcy petition. It could not affect the separate costs order made by Butterfield J on 7 May 1999, upon which the bankruptcy order was based.
3. The letter dated 18 February 2000 merely recorded the Deputy Master’s view of the effect of Master Eyre’s order. Read in context, it imposed no further stay and could not be construed as restraining enforcement of Butterfield J’s costs order. The court should not infer that a court officer intended to exceed jurisdiction in the absence of clear words.
4. CPR 52.16(1) did not confer on the relevant Court of Appeal officer jurisdiction to make a stay of execution. Further, a stay would ordinarily require an opportunity for the enforcing party to be heard, and no sufficient basis for such a stay had been shown.
5. The respondent’s application for a Grepe v Loam order was granted. The appellant’s repeated, unsuccessful and increasingly unrealistic applications had wasted court resources and caused further expense. He was therefore required to obtain prior permission before making any further application or taking any step in the Court of Appeal or a court below arising from the proceedings. Any permission application was to be made in writing without notice and dealt with on paper.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — The court refused permission to appeal against the dismissal by Mr McCombe QC, sitting as a Deputy Judge of the Chancery Division, of the appeal concerning annulment of the bankruptcy order. It also refused the other outstanding applications and made a Grepe v Loam order.
• Chancery Division — Mr McCombe QC dismissed the appeal against the refusal by Mr Registrar Baister to annul the bankruptcy order and ordered costs.
• Bankruptcy Court — Mr Registrar Baister refused annulment under section 282(1) of the Insolvency Act 1986.
• Queen’s Bench Division — Master Eyre struck out the substantive claim for disclosing no reasonable cause of action. Butterfield J dismissed the appeal and ordered costs.