Mallon v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis

Permission to appeal should be refused where the proposed grounds are not reasonably arguable and have no real prospect of success. Findings about witness reliability and the weight of independent evidence are ordinarily matters for the trial judge, particularly where the judge has carefully considered the evidence. Ordinary trial management, including restricting irrelevant questioning and clarifying evidence, does not by itself demonstrate unfairness. Speculative assertions about possible video evidence, or medical evidence relevant only to quantum, do not establish an arguable appeal where liability has been properly tried.

The applicant, appearing in person, sought permission to appeal and an extension of time following a trial concerning an injury sustained during police restraint in a public house. The trial judge found that the police had used no more force than was reasonably necessary, that the fracture was an unfortunate accident, and that there had been no deliberate or negligent conduct. The applicant challenged the reliability of witnesses, inconsistencies in police accounts, the conduct and management of the trial, medical evidence, and alleged video evidence. The central issue was whether those grounds were reasonably arguable and offered a real prospect of success.

Application refused.

1. The relevant question on the application for permission was whether the proposed criticisms of the trial judgment were reasonably arguable and disclosed a real prospect of a successful appeal.
2. The trial judge was entitled to assess the reliability of the witnesses. It was particularly appropriate for the judge to decide whether to accept the evidence of an apparently independent witness and whether that witness was genuinely independent and reliable. The judge had carefully considered those matters.
3. The alleged discrepancies in the police evidence were ordinary inconsistencies of the kind that commonly arise at trial. They did not provide an arguable basis for appellate intervention. The judge’s critical finding was also not shown to contain the alleged misapprehension about when the arm was broken.
4. The complaints about the conduct of the trial did not establish unfairness. A judge may control questioning and restrict irrelevant material. Where a party is unrepresented, the judge may ask searching questions of witnesses to understand the dispute fully.
5. The medical evidence was principally relevant to the amount of damages, and the judge had dealt with quantum in case an appeal succeeded. The alleged video evidence was speculative: it was uncertain whether any tapes existed, whether they had survived, and what they would have recorded.
6. Taken together, the grounds disclosed no prospect of a successful appeal. The combined application for permission to appeal and extension of time was therefore refused.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On 5 June 2001, Lord Justice Longmore refused the application for permission to appeal and extension of time, finding no prospect of a successful appeal.
2. Trial court: The trial judge found that the police had used reasonable and necessary force, that the arm fracture was accidental, and that the police were neither deliberate nor negligent in causing it.