Roberts v Secretary Of State For Social Security

Statutory presumptions such as de minimis yield to clear and mandatory wording. Where legislation provides that any fraction of a year is counted as a full year, the court must give effect to that provision, including a very small fraction, unless the statute creates an exception.

The time at which a person attains an age expressed in years is determined by the statutory rule making it the commencement of the relevant anniversary of birth. Where an Act refers to time, Interpretation Act 1978 section 9 requires Greenwich mean time unless the Act provides otherwise. That rule applies irrespective of the place of birth.

The applicant’s husband died shortly before midnight on 26 June 1997. The Secretary of State applied a seven per cent reduction to her widow’s pension under section 39(4) of the Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992, treating her as under 55 at the relevant time.

The Social Security Appeal Tribunal had reached the opposite conclusion. On 8 June 2000, Commissioner Pacey allowed the Secretary of State’s appeal and directed that the reduction apply. Brooke LJ refused permission on paper. The applicant renewed the application before the Court of Appeal, arguing that the de minimis principle applied and that her birthday should be calculated by reference to Philippine time.

1. Application refused. The Commissioner’s decision disclosed no arguable error of law with a real prospect of success.
2. Section 39(4) of the Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992 provided that any fraction of a year was to be counted as a year when calculating the reduction in a widow’s pension. The wording was specific, mandatory and expressed without exception. It therefore displaced any presumptive application of the de minimis principle. The fact that the applicant was only slightly under 55 could not alter the statutory calculation.
3. Section 173 of the 1992 Act provided that a person attained an age expressed in years at the commencement of the relevant anniversary of the date of birth. The statutory mechanism was sufficiently clear and had to be applied according to its terms.
4. Section 9 of the Interpretation Act 1978 required references to time in an Act to be construed by reference to Greenwich mean time, subject to the statutory exception concerning summer time. Accordingly, the applicant’s birth date and the commencement of her 55th birthday were to be determined by Greenwich mean time, regardless of whether she was born in the Philippines or elsewhere.
5. The application could not be assisted by new evidence concerning the time of birth. The Court considered the point on its merits and concluded that it could not affect the statutory result.

The application for permission to appeal was refused, with a legal aid assessment.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On 10 May 2001, the renewed application for permission to appeal was refused.
• Social Security Commissioner: On 8 June 2000, Commissioner Pacey allowed the Secretary of State’s appeal from the Social Security Appeal Tribunal and directed a seven per cent weekly reduction under section 39(4) of the Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992.
• Social Security Appeal Tribunal: On 11 March 1998, the tribunal had reached the contrary conclusion on the pension reduction.