Tracy & Anor v Jones

The Court of Appeal has no jurisdiction to hear a direct appeal from a county court where the case was not allocated to the multi-track, subject to the statutory exceptions governing appeal destinations. A previous appeal heard by two Lord Justices cannot be reopened merely because the applicants consider that three judges were required. The Human Rights Act 1998 provides no retrospective right to reopen a judicial act occurring before section 7 came into force. A court may correct an accidental slip or omission in an order at any time. A formal application notice is unnecessary, and an informal written request may suffice.

The applicants had brought proceedings concerning a sea wall and had previously appealed unsuccessfully to the Court of Appeal. They later sought to reopen that appeal, challenge decisions made in subsequent county court proceedings, and appeal an order by Lightman J correcting the costs provision in an earlier order under the slip rule.

Master Joseph refused to set down the proposed applications. Lightman J refused permission to appeal his correction of the costs order. The applicants applied to the Court of Appeal for review and permission to appeal. The issues included the constitution and jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal, the temporal application of the Human Rights Act 1998, the destination of county court appeals, and the scope of the slip rule.

1. Earlier appeal and Convention arguments. The previous appeal had been conclusively determined. Under section 54(4) of the Supreme Court Act 1981, the Court of Appeal was properly constituted by two judges when hearing an appeal from the county court. The applicants could not obtain a rehearing merely because the earlier appeal had not been heard by three Lord Justices.
2. Human Rights Act 1998. Sections 6 and 7 of the Human Rights Act 1998 applied to judicial acts, but section 9 limited proceedings concerning such acts to an appeal, judicial review, or a prescribed forum. Section 22(4) prevented section 7(1) from applying to acts occurring before section 7 came into force. The 2000 appeal therefore could not generate a new Convention-based application.
3. County court appeal destination. Under the Access to Justice 1999 (Destination of Appeals) Order 2000, article 3 generally directed county court appeals to the High Court. Article 4 preserved a route to the Court of Appeal for a final decision allocated to the multi-track. Since the relevant proceedings had not been so allocated, the Court of Appeal had no jurisdiction. The applications had to be made to the High Court.
4. Correction of accidental slip. Rule 40.12 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 empowered the court to correct an accidental slip or omission in a judgment or order at any time. The request could be made informally by letter and did not require a formal application notice. Lightman J was entitled to reconsider the costs order and, on the evidence available, there was no real prospect of successfully challenging his conclusion that the order contained a slip.
5. The applications were dismissed. A copy of the transcript was to be provided to the applicants at public expense.

• Court of Appeal: An earlier appeal from the trial decision was dismissed by Chadwick LJ and Buxton LJ on 17 February 2000.
• High Court: Lightman J corrected the earlier costs order and refused permission to appeal. Master Joseph refused to set down the applicants’ proposed applications.
• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The present applications for review and permission to appeal were dismissed.