Secretary of State for Trade & Industry v Winter & Anor

An appellate court should not interfere with a case-management decision to refuse an adjournment unless the decision was plainly wrong. The need for legal representation depends on the issues and circumstances of the case. Where proceedings involve purely factual disputes, a fair trial is not necessarily impossible because a party is unrepresented. The public interest in resolving proceedings promptly may properly be weighed against a request for substantial delay to obtain litigation funding.

The Secretary of State sought disqualification orders against two former directors of Maples Stores Plc under the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. The proceedings concerned alleged manipulation of the company’s books and misleading statements to creditors. The applicants’ insurance-funded legal representation had been withdrawn, and they sought a substantial adjournment to raise funds for their defence.

Blackburne J refused the adjournment and permission to appeal. The applicants sought permission from the Court of Appeal, arguing that refusal would deprive them of a fair opportunity to contest substantial factual allegations and would pressure them into accepting the Carecraft procedure.

1. Application refused. The Court of Appeal refused permission to appeal, with costs subject to detailed assessment. The trial was to commence on 18 June 2001.
2. The decision whether to adjourn was a matter for the judge’s discretion. The appellate court would not set aside that decision merely because it might have reached a different conclusion. Intervention required the judge’s conclusion to be plainly wrong.
3. The applicants had already had a fair opportunity to present their case. The fact that they might be unable to obtain legal representation on the scale considered desirable did not establish that a fair trial was impossible.
4. Where the issues were purely factual, legal representation was not necessarily required for a fair trial. The court was not satisfied that the proposed adjournment would in fact produce the funds required for representation.
5. The judge was entitled to take account of the public interest in determining the disqualification proceedings as soon as reasonably possible. The refusal of an adjournment did not compel the applicants to give undertakings under the Carecraft procedure, since they remained free to contest the proceedings.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Permission to appeal from Blackburne J’s refusal of an adjournment was refused. The order was left undisturbed.