Hoath v Cripps Harries Hall

Judicial review is not an appropriate route for challenging lower-court decisions where ordinary civil proceedings provide an adequate appeal mechanism. Its discretionary nature means that it will not be used where a more suitable alternative process is available. Judicial review should not run in parallel with conventional appeals concerning the same subject matter, since that would give the claimant two opportunities to contest the same issue. The availability and use of ordinary bankruptcy appeal procedures therefore made judicial review inappropriate.

The applicant had been made bankrupt in 1991 following a default judgment obtained by solicitors who had acted for him. After unsuccessful attempts to annul the bankruptcy, he made further applications in 2000 concerning annulment, assignment by the trustee in bankruptcy, and possession and sale of his home. He sought judicial review of District Judge Polden’s decisions. Turner J refused permission on 30 March 2001, holding that the complaints belonged in ordinary civil proceedings and that appeal mechanisms were available. The applicant applied to the Court of Appeal for permission to appeal, arguing that the lower court’s conduct raised a public-law issue. The central question was whether judicial review was appropriate alongside the conventional appeal process.

The application for permission to appeal was dismissed by Lord Justice Keene.

1. Nature of the proposed proceedings. The applicant sought to challenge District Judge Polden’s decisions concerning further bankruptcy applications and possession and sale of his home. He also sought to reopen the validity of the original bankruptcy order. Those complaints substantially overlapped with matters being pursued through ordinary civil appeals.
2. Alternative remedy. Turner J had correctly held that the matters complained of were suitable for normal civil proceedings, not judicial review. Procedures existed for challenging bankruptcy decisions and had been, or were being, used. Appeals had been dismissed by Neuberger J, with leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal being sought.
3. No parallel judicial review. Keene LJ could not distinguish the issues advanced in the proposed judicial review from those raised in the conventional appeals. Judicial review is a discretionary remedy and should not be employed where a more suitable alternative process is available. It was inappropriate to run judicial review in parallel with the civil appeals, as that would seek two bites at the same cherry.
4. Order. There was no prospect of successfully appealing Turner J’s soundly based decision. The application for permission to appeal was dismissed.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division). On 19 June 2001, the court dismissed the application for permission to appeal, agreeing with Turner J that judicial review was inappropriate.
2. High Court, Administrative Court. Turner J refused permission to apply for judicial review on 30 March 2001, holding that the complaints should be pursued through ordinary civil proceedings and available appeal mechanisms.
3. Tunbridge Wells County Court and subsequent appeal. District Judge Polden made the challenged bankruptcy-related decisions in October 2000. Appeals and a later possession order were considered by Neuberger J on 8 June 2001 and dismissed; leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal was being sought.