Rampal v Rampal (No 2)

A criminal act connected with a statutory claim does not automatically create an absolute ex turpi causa bar. The court must assess proportionately the nature and seriousness of the crime, the applicant’s culpability and the surrounding circumstances. In ancillary-relief proceedings, the statutory discretion, including conduct under section 25(2)(g) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, provides a further means of addressing dishonourable conduct. Whiston v Whiston [1995] Fam 198 remains binding in a comparably culpable case, but does not exclude every culpable bigamist regardless of circumstances.

The parties’ 1975 ceremony was void because the husband remained married to another woman. After the marriage broke down, the husband sought ancillary relief. The wife obtained orders setting aside the divorce decrees and permitting a nullity claim. Hogg J granted that relief: [2000] 2 FLR 763. Following a fact-finding hearing, Mr Bellamy QC rejected the wife’s account that she had been unaware of the husband’s earlier marriage, but held that Whiston v Whiston barred the husband’s financial claim. The husband appealed. The central issue was whether public policy automatically barred every applicant who had knowingly participated in a bigamous marriage.

Disposition

Thorpe LJ delivered the leading judgment. Lord Justice Robert Walker and the President, Lady Justice Butler-Sloss, agreed. The appeal was allowed unanimously.

1. Public policy and statutory claims. The ex turpi causa principle is not applied absolutely to statutory claims arising from criminal conduct. The court must make a proportionate judgment after careful scrutiny of the nature of the crime and the relevant surrounding circumstances. The approach in Reg v Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex Parte Puttick [1981] 1 QB 767, R v Chief National Insurance Commissioner Ex Parte Connor [1981] QB 758 and Gray v Barr [1971] 2 QB 554 supported that conclusion. The authorities showed that the legal label attached to the offence was not decisive.
2. Bigamy. Whiston v Whiston [1995] Fam 198 was binding so far as it permitted a preliminary bar in a comparably culpable case. It did not establish a universal rule excluding every culpable bigamist from ancillary relief. The distinction drawn in S-T (formerly J) v J [1998] Fam 103 between a crime constituting the marriage and a collateral offence did not prevent the court from assessing the culpability of another bigamous applicant on its own facts.
3. Statutory discretion. Sections 23 and 24, read with section 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, required consideration of all the circumstances. Conduct could be addressed under section 25(2)(g), and an obviously dishonourable claim could be curtailed through the statutory discretion rather than by an inflexible public-policy rule. Re Royse (Deceased) [1985] 1 Ch 22 and Re H (Deceased) [1990] 1 FLR 441 illustrated the fact-sensitive approach.
4. Application. Once the husband’s account was established, the gravity of his offence was insufficient to deny his statutory rights. The concession made below was therefore correct. The alternative Article 6 argument would have failed: a summary strike-out mechanism is compatible with Article 6 if preceded by a full and fair hearing.

The ancillary-relief application was reinstated for hearing by a High Court judge of the Family Division. The wife was ordered to pay the husband’s costs, subject to detailed assessment and the specified enforcement restriction. Permission to appeal to the House of Lords was refused.

1. Court of Appeal — The appeal was allowed. The husband’s ancillary-relief application was reinstated and directed to be heard by a High Court judge of the Family Division.
2. High Court, Family Division — Hogg J set aside the divorce decrees and granted leave for an amended answer seeking nullity: [2000] 2 FLR 763. Mr Bellamy QC later conducted the fact-finding hearing and held that Whiston v Whiston barred the husband’s claim.