Sherif v Sherif

When a financial order is returned to the first-instance judge after permission to appeal has been refused, the task is to ensure that the order reflects the judge’s true intention, not to reopen the substantive merits. The order must be assessed as a whole. An apparent failure to revalue one asset does not justify appellate intervention where the overall allocation, including an additional allowance, sufficiently offsets the alleged disadvantage. A Court of Appeal may update dates in the order to account for delay caused by the permission application where the amendments are purely administrative and do not alter its effect.

The wife applied for permission to appeal an order made by His Honour Judge Ryland on 6 February 2002 concerning the division of the parties’ matrimonial assets. Following an earlier refusal of permission, the matter had been returned to the judge so that the drafted order could reflect his original intention. The order gave the wife an option to buy the more valuable property or, alternatively, provided for its sale and division of the proceeds.

The wife argued that the order revalued one property but failed to account for an increase in the value of the property occupied by the husband. The central issue was whether that omission caused substantive injustice requiring appellate intervention.

The application for permission to appeal was refused. Lord Justice Thorpe gave the judgment, with which Mr Justice Wall agreed.

1. The purpose of the earlier referral back to the first-instance judge was to ensure that the order, as drafted, reflected the judge’s true intentions. It was not an opportunity to reopen or alter the substantive financial decision.
2. The order had to be considered as a whole. Although it did not provide expressly for revaluation of the property occupied by the husband, the judge had deliberately allowed the wife 40 per cent of the available net assets, together with an additional £23,000 for credit cards and pension provision. The order therefore gave her the highest of the alternative figures identified in the judge’s earlier reasoning.
3. Any disadvantage caused by the absence of a revaluation of the second property was sufficiently offset by the additional £23,000 allowance. On the husband’s estimate, the denied 40 per cent share of the increase in that property’s value was approximately matched by that allowance. There was accordingly no sufficient basis for substantive interference with the judge’s carefully considered order.
4. The dates in the order had become outdated because of the time taken by the permission application. They could be amended administratively to reflect the lost time without changing the order’s effect, granting permission, or formally receiving the appeal.

The dates in paragraphs 4, 6, 7, 8, 12 and 13 of the order were substituted as indicated in the judgment. Subject to those revisions, the application for permission to appeal was refused.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Permission to appeal was refused. The dates in the order of 6 February 2002 were amended to reflect the delay caused by the permission application.
2. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On an earlier application, both parties were refused permission and the matter was referred back to the first-instance court so that the order could reflect the judge’s true intention.
3. Central London Civil Justice Centre: His Honour Judge Ryland made a comprehensive order on 6 February 2002 concerning the wife’s share of the parties’ assets, including an option to buy out the husband or a sale and division of proceeds.