Edwards v Williamson & Anor

The scope of an employer’s duty towards an employee suffering stress-related illness is fact-sensitive. In a difficult management situation, the duty may properly be confined to arranging a proper medical investigation of the employee’s fitness to return to work. A disciplinary hearing following a genuine stress-related illness may nevertheless constitute a foreseeable breach of the duty of care and the contractual term of employment. Damages are limited to loss caused by that breach. Where the evidence shows that the employee’s illness would inevitably have recurred, the breach may be treated as causing only a temporary exacerbation.

The claimant, a teacher, appealed from a decision of His Honour Judge Hawkesworth QC in the Leeds County Court. The judge found that the defendants had acted reasonably in deciding teaching arrangements and in managing the claimant’s absence and proposed return to work. He found, however, that summoning the claimant to a disciplinary hearing shortly after his return, and issuing a formal warning, was inappropriate and foreseeable to cause further stress.

The judge awarded £2,000 for the resulting acceleration of the claimant’s psychiatric collapse, assessed at approximately six months. The claimant sought permission to appeal, challenging the scope of the defendants’ duty and the assessment of causation and damages.

1. Application refused. The county court judge had given a clear and careful judgment, and there was no proper basis for criticising his findings.
2. The decision not to allocate the claimant to A-level or higher-ability teaching was not unreasonable. Senior staff were entitled to balance the abilities and aptitudes of available teachers against their comparative absence records and the educational interests of pupils. The claimant’s reliance on the defendants’ conduct before September 1996 therefore failed.
3. During the claimant’s prolonged absence with depression, the defendants’ duty did not extend beyond arranging a proper medical investigation into his fitness to return to work. In the circumstances, the judge was entitled to reach that conclusion. The situation involved a highly vulnerable employee, a substantial history of dealings, and difficulties in communicating with him.
4. The disciplinary hearing shortly after the claimant’s return was different. Treating a genuine stress-related illness as grounds for disciplinary action was misconceived and unsympathetic. It was reasonably foreseeable that the procedure and formal warning would cause further stress. The judge was entitled to find a breach both of the defendants’ duty of care and of the co-extensive contractual term.
5. The assessment of damages was also sustainable. The expert evidence supported the conclusion that the claimant’s depressive illness would probably have recurred in any event if he had remained at work and continued to experience disappointment or perceived criticism. The disciplinary proceedings materially contributed to a temporary exacerbation until approximately September 1997, but did not cause the continuing condition or subsequent incapacity.
6. Lord Justice Thorpe delivered the judgment. Mr Justice Wall agreed. The application was refused with costs to be assessed, subject to the claimant’s liability being certified as nil.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Permission to appeal was refused. The order of His Honour Judge Hawkesworth QC was left undisturbed, subject to the costs directions made by this court.
• Leeds County Court: The defendants succeeded except in relation to the disciplinary hearing, for which the claimant was awarded £2,000.