Morgan v Morgan

Sentencing for contempt of court serves two purposes: marking the gravity of the proved conduct and marking the deliberate breach of a court order. Although imprisonment will not ordinarily be imposed automatically for a first proved breach, there is no hard and fast rule requiring suspension. The court may impose immediate imprisonment where the circumstances, the judge’s assessment of the parties, and the absence of any acknowledgement or assurance against repetition make that course appropriate. A sentencing court must also guard against punishing the same conduct twice if parallel criminal proceedings continue, while recognising the additional gravity of deliberate disobedience of a court order.

The husband appealed against a two-month sentence of imprisonment for contempt of court. The sentence followed findings that he had breached an injunction made under the Family Law Act 1996 by making threats to kill and approaching a protected address.

He argued that his counsel had not been given a separate opportunity to address the judge on penalty, that immediate imprisonment was disproportionate because this was the first proved breach, and that the judge had failed to account for parallel criminal proceedings. The appeal concerned the fairness and legality of the sentencing exercise, including whether the sentence should have been suspended.

1. Appeal dismissed. The judge had heard submissions relevant to penalty before retiring to consider her decision. Although the judgment did not separately structure the findings and sentence, no objection was made when the sentence was announced. The alleged procedural failure therefore did not justify intervention.
2. There is no hard and fast rule that imprisonment for a first proved breach must be suspended. The appropriateness of immediate imprisonment depends on the facts and the judge’s assessment of the parties and the conduct. Here, the husband denied the breaches, offered no acknowledgement that his conduct was unacceptable, and gave no assurance that it would not recur. The groundwork for a suspended sentence had not been laid.
3. The sentencing judge was entitled to rely on the evidence she had heard and to conclude that immediate imprisonment was within her discretion. Her reference to a history of orders and breaches was potentially imprecise, but it did not warrant appellate interference in a case where the sentence was otherwise justified.
4. Where parallel criminal proceedings arise from the same conduct, courts must ensure that the offender is not punished twice. If those proceedings continue, any later sentencing court must take the contempt sentence into account. Contempt proceedings nevertheless contain an additional element: deliberate disobedience of a court order. Sentencing must mark both the gravity of the conduct proved and the gravity of deliberate breach.

Per Lady Justice Hale, with Lord Justice Latham agreeing.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) dismissed the appeal against the two-month committal sentence imposed by Newport County Court on 25 June 2002.
• Newport County Court, before Her Honour Judge Case, imposed immediate imprisonment for contempt of court arising from breaches of an injunction made under the Family Law Act 1996.