Halifax Plc & Ors v Halifax Repossessions Ltd & Ors

Summary judgment may be granted in trademark infringement and passing-off proceedings where company names, viewed with the available evidence, are instruments of fraud or threats to trade upon the claimant’s goodwill. The court may rely on British Telecommunications Plc v One in a Million where the names and the defendants’ proposed activities disclose an inherent likelihood of passing-off. A merely asserted possibility of using the companies for an unrelated business does not prevent summary relief where the companies’ stated business classifications correspond with the claimant’s financial activities. Permission to appeal should be refused where the proposed appeal has no realistic prospect of success.

Seven companies in the Halifax group brought trademark infringement and passing-off proceedings against three companies bearing “Halifax” in their names and against associated individuals. The claimants alleged use, or threatened use, of an identical sign in the course of trade and conduct amounting to passing-off. Blackburne J granted summary judgment, finding that the defendant companies were instruments of fraud and that there was an inherent likelihood of passing-off. He ordered payment on account of costs. Mr Gopee sought permission to appeal, arguing that the companies were off-the-shelf companies, that British Telecommunications Plc v One in a Million was distinguishable, and that the order infringed his human rights.

1. Permission to appeal refused. The prospects of a successful appeal were non-existent.
2. Blackburne J was entitled to rely on British Telecommunications Plc v One in a Million. On the face of the documents, the defendant company names were instruments of fraud, used or apparently intended to be used to trade upon the goodwill of the Halifax group and to deprive it of its property.
3. Although Mr Gopee’s assertion that he acquired the companies off the shelf was accepted at this stage, that fact did not undermine the summary judgment. The suggestion that the companies might instead be used for selling bread was untenable because their stated business classifications concerned legal, business, monetary and financial intermediation and credit-granting activities. Those activities corresponded broadly with the claimants’ business.
4. The human-rights complaint and the proposed distinction from British Telecommunications Plc v One in a Million disclosed no arguable basis for appeal.
5. The challenge to the £12,000 payment on account of costs did not justify permission to appeal. Any excessive amount could be resolved on detailed assessment.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): permission to appeal from Blackburne J’s summary judgment order was refused.
• High Court of Justice, Chancery Division: Blackburne J granted summary judgment for trademark infringement and passing-off and ordered payment on account of costs.